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UNNECESSARY ROUGHNESS:
CLARETT V. NFL BLITZES THE COLLEGE
DRAFT AND EXEMPLIFIES WHY
ANTITRUST LAW
IS ALSO 'A GAME OF INCHES'
ELEANOR M. HYNES*
I. INTRODUCTION
An oft-repeated clich6 labels football 'a game of inches' played
on a field measured in yards.1 The implication is clear - a
fraction of the yardstick is potentially the difference between
glory and defeat.2 Antitrust jurisprudence functions in much the
same way; expansive standards mark the field, yet individual
*J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2005. At St. John's, she served
on the Executive Board of the St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary as Research &
Symposium Editor. The author, first and foremost, thanks her mother and brother whose
love and assistance have helped her throughout her legal endeavors, and also thanks to
her Uncle Jim for his support as well. Special thanks to Eric M. Ovalle in appreciation for
his introduction to this topic and constant support. This article is dedicated to the
memory of the author's grandmother and grandfather, Eleanor and Norman Reid.
1 See Kevin Bonser, How American Football Works, at http://entertainment.howstuff
works.com/footballl.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004) (introducing football as game of
inches played on field measured in yards); Ed Duckworth, A Game of Inches, SOUTHCOAST
TODAY, Oct. 12, 2000 (stating "the old cliche about baseball, that it's a game of inches,
often applies to the way things play out in NFL"), available at http://www.s-
t.com/daily/10-00/10-12-00/b06sp098.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2004); Bob O'Connor & Al
Groh, A Football Game Is More Than A Jousting Match, at http://www.tnfj.coml
EAFCA/articlesfbob-oconnor.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2004) (explaining that "football is a
game of inches" is an old football maxim).
2 See Clichg Site, at http://clichesite.com/content.asp?which=tip+2081 (last visited
Nov. 4, 2004) (explaining 'a game of inches' to mean that certain outcomes are determined
by very slight changes); Wes Holtsclaw, Unexpected Exit for No. 1 Highlanders,
ELIZABETHTON STAR, available at http://www.starhq.com/html/sports/1103/111003high
landers.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2004) (comparing life and football as both "a game of
inches"); Brett W. Meach, Pirates Dissect Louisville Disaster into a Handful of Mistakes,
WASH. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 7, 2004 (describing a game which was decided by a mere eight
plays), available at http://www.wdnweb.com/articles/2004/10/07/sports/sports0l.txt (last
visited Nov. 6, 2004).
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proceedings are often decided by minute details. 3 However, a
player in a football game has at least one major advantage over
an attorney embroiled in an antitrust suit: a playbook. 4 A football
team's playbook is unambiguous and standard for every player
on the team. In contrast, the myriad of Supreme Court antitrust
approaches to professional sports leagues frequently leaves
practitioners in a quandary of confusion.5 The sheer number of
conflicting doctrines employed in factually similar cases has
resulted in little continuity among the circuit courts. 6 When star
college football player Maurice Clarett challenged the National
Football League's draft rules, he did more than change the face of
professional football and the college draft.7 Clarett v. National
3 See Mark C. Anderson, Self-Regulation and League Rules Under The Sherman Act,
30 CAP. U. L. REV. 125, 127 (2002) (explaining "Congress left it to the courts to determine
whether an antitrust violation has transpired"); Nolan Ezra Clark, Antitrust Comes Full
Circle: The Return to the Cartelization Standard, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (1985)
(stating the "Rule of Reason doctrine proved to be inherently amorphous"); Thomas Kobin,
The National Collegiate Athletic Association's No Agent and No Draft Rules: The Realities
of Collegiate Sports are Forcing Change, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 483, 489 (1994)
(describing one antitrust approach as requiring nebulous fact specific analysis).
4 See James Adler, About Football Glossary, at http://football.about.com/cs/football
101/g/gl-playbook.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2004) (defining "playbook" as a collection of
plays teams use, put into notebook format and issued to each member of team); Football
Archive Playbook, at http://library.thinkquest.org/12590/playbook.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
2004) (illustrating examples of football plays commonly included in playbooks);
Football.com Online Confidential Playbook, at http://www.football.com/playbook/index
.shtml (last visited Nov. 6, 2004) (discussing various plays and schemes).
5 See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (holding baseball games are not commerce); Clarett v. Nat'l
Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 405 n.164 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2004) (citing Bogan v.
Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing that the scope of certain antitrust
rules is recognized as source of confusion); see also Gary Roberts, Sports League
Restraints on the Labor Market: The Failure of Stare Decisis, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 337, 338
(1986) (describing cases in this field as "simply us[ing] the Sherman Act as a vehicle for
developing results oriented rules of law having no basis in antitrust policy").
6 Renee Grewe, Antitrust Law and the Less Restrictive Alternatives Doctrine: A Case
Study of Its Application in the Sports Context, 9 SPORTS LAW J. 227, 237-45 (2002)
(highlighting lack of continuity in application of antitrust doctrine among circuit courts);
Sarah Konsky, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA Transfer Rules, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1581, 1588 (2003) (discussing various methods employed by lower courts to determine
whether a restraint is illegal under the Sherman Act); Don Nottingham, Comment,
Keeping the Home Team at Home: Antitrust and Trademark Law as Weapons in the Fight
Against Professional Sports Franchise Relocation, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1074 (2004)
(stating "what is a 'reasonable' rule for sports leagues is far from settled").
7 See Clarett Sues Over Draft Eligibility Rule, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 23, 2003
(announcing Maurice Clarett lawsuit against NFL), at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com
2003/footballlncaa/09/23/bc.fbc.ohiost.clarett.ap/index.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2004);
Lawyer: Clarett Will Be in Draft, ESPN, Feb. 11, 2004 (gauging Clarett's chances for
victory in antitrust suit), available at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncflnews/story?id=1732768
(last visited Nov. 6, 2004). See generally Mark Maske, From Prom to Pros: The Way is
Open for Player to Go From High School to NFL, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2004, at D01
(analyzing the impact high school players have on the college football draft).
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Football Leagues brought attention to the perplexing antitrust
standards commonly applied in suits involving professional
sports leagues. 9 This article will critically analyze the evolution
of certain antitrust and labor law approaches to the plight of
professional football players, and propose improved criteria to be
used when evaluating future NFL antitrust suits.10
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Line of Scrimmage - The Sherman & Clayton Acts
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act" in 1890 to
prohibit unreasonable restraints on trade.12 The Act's sponsor,
Senator John Sherman, desired it to be a general guide for
American commerce, describing trusts as "inconsistent with our
form of government."13 Section 1 of the Act proscribes concerted
actions that restrain interstate commerce. 14 Section 2 bans
monopolization of trade.15 While on its face the Sherman Act
8 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), .
9 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 124 (stating the interaction of antitrust laws and federal
labor legislation is an area of law marked more by controversy than by clarity) (citing
Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Roberts, supra
note 5, at 338 (noting there are many published antitrust decisions involving sports
league market restraints that have adopted doctrines that, when followed, have "simply
become a formulation by which the blind lead the blind"). See generally Ready For a Fight,
Sports Experts Like Clarett's Chances of Overturning Draft Eligibility Rule, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 17, 2003 (predicting Clarett's chances of success), available at http://
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2003/footballlnfl/09/17/clarett.nfl.ap/index.html (last visited
Nov. 6, 2004).
10 See discussion infra Parts III - V (analyzing antitrust and labor law approaches).
11 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) [hereinafter Sherman Act].
12 See id. (stating those actions that are illegal); see also Milton Handler, Reforming
the Antitrust Laws, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1287, 1288 (1982) (declaring "no other legislation
has continued to command the support and confidence of the American people over so long
a period"). See generally Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 793, 795 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining §
1 of Sherman Act).
13 See Anderson, supra note 3, at 127 (citing 1721 Cong. Rec. 2457 (1890)) (describing
background of the Sherman Act).
14 See Sherman Act, supra note 11 (stating "[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal"); see also Business
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 484 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (positing the Court
has always interpreted Section 1 of the Act as intending only to prohibit unreasonable
restraints on trade); Anderson, supra note 3, at 127-28 (expanding "concerted actions" to
include contracts, combinations or conspiracies).
15 See Sherman Act, supra note 11, at § 2 (requiring "every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony"); Denise Bryant, Note, Brown v.
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bans every conspiracy in restraint of trade, the Supreme Court
has held that only agreements that "unreasonably" restrain trade
fall under the Act.16 The broad language of the Act has resulted
in wide discretion for the courts when examining antitrust
allegations. 17 The result being that no less than four (possibly
five) different methods have been used by the Supreme Court to
analyze the reasonableness of a restraint on trade.'5
The Sherman Act did not specifically address agreements
between employers and unions that interfere with commercial
activities.19 Labor and antitrust policies are often in conflict.20
Labor unions, naturally, suppress competition in an effort to
Pro Football: You Make the Call!, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 87, 89 (1997) (discussing
history of the Sherman Act); James M. Sellers, Comment, The Black Market and
Intellectual Property: A Potential Sherman Act Section Two Antitrust Defense, 14 ALB. L.J.
Sci. & TECH. 583, 589-90 (2004) (explaining section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns
monopolization of certain economic practices).
16 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958) (declaring the Sherman Act only
precludes unreasonable restraints of trade); Standard Oil v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911)
(holding allegations of Sherman Act violations should be examined under rule of reason);
see also Jonathan Choslovsky, Note & Comment, Agency Review of Health Care Industry
Mergers: Proper Procedure or Unnecessary Burden?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 291, 325 n.132
(1996) (citing Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. v. Bd. of Regents of Okla., 469 U.S. 85, 98
(1984)).
17 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982) (asserting
applicable standard); see also Anderson, supra note 3, at 127 (positing Congress left courts
to decide when antitrust violations have occurred); Debra A. Gilmore, The Antitrust
Implications of Boycotts by Health Care Professionals: Professional Standards,
Professional Ethics and the First Amendment, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 221, 232-33 (1988)
(discussing situations in which courts have discretion to allow certain behaviors with
purposes not solely anticompetitive in nature).
18 See discussion infra Part IV.E; see also Kathryn A. Kusske, Note, Refusal to Deal
as a Per Se Violation of the Sherman Act: Russell Stover Attacks the Colgate Doctrine, 33
AM. U. L. REV 463, 484 (1984) (discussing two possible approaches courts may use to
analyze the reasonableness of restraint on trade); Laura Mirabito, Picking Players in the
College Draft Could be Picking Trouble with Antitrust Law, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823,
827 (1996) (noting multiple approaches have been used to examine reasonableness of
restraints of trade). See generally Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 620
(1976) (employing various methods in analyzing reasonableness of restraint on trade).
19 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 260 (1996) (addressing the fact that
agreements resulting from union-employer relations are not always exempt from
Sherman Act scrutiny); see also Mirabito, supra note 18, at 827 (pointing to broad
language of the Sherman Act); Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust
Policy: The Special Case of Sports League Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEO. L.J. 19, 59-60
(1986) [hereinafter Gary Roberts] (explaining how the Court applied a labor exemption to
an agreement so it could apply the Sherman Act to the policy of labor laws).
20 See Larry Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d
1368, 1378 (3rd Cir. 1979) (noting the conflict created by labor and antitrust policies is
apparent). But see Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,
421 U.S. 616, 636 (1975) (pointing out both Congress and the Supreme Court have
tailored antitrust statutes to avoid conflict with labor policy); Pamela Clark, Note, Brown
v. Pro Football: The Supreme Court Benches a Player's Right to Negotiate Salary, 35
HOUS. L. REV. 571, 587 (1998) [hereinafter Pamela Clark] (recognizing conflict between
labor and antitrust policies).
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raise wages.21 Federal labor statutes, including the National
Labor Relations Act,22 favor free and private collective
bargaining.23 However, union tactics often result in the restraint
of trade. 24 The Supreme Court originally interpreted the
Sherman Act as prohibiting labor union activities that impeded
trade, including boycotts. 25 In response, Congress passed the
Clayton Act in 1914.26 In addition to creating a private cause of
action for individuals injured by antitrust violations,27 the
Clayton Act also exempted certain labor-related activities from
antitrust scrutiny.28 Section 6 of the Act provides that,
21 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 234 (citing R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 31
(2d ed. 1981)) (examining the relationship between labor and antitrust law); Victoria
Bassetti, Weeding RICO Out of Garden Variety Labor Disputes, 92 COLUMB. L. REV. 103,
193 n.175 (1992) (explaining that after the passage of Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890,
courts held unions were seeking to decrease competition among workers over wages, and
found them in violation of the Act); Michael J. Frank, Accretion Elections: Making
Employee Choice Paramount, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 101, 165 n.258 (2002) (asserting
the best way to suppress competition is to coerce an employer not to deal with non-union
employees).
22 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2004) [hereinafter NLRA].
23 See id. (articulating federal labor policy); NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.,
120 F.2d 262, 267 (3rd Cir. 1941) (noting the policy of the NLRA was to encourage the
practice of collective bargaining); David W. Orlandini, Employee Participation Programs:
How to Make Them Work Today and in the Twenty-First Century, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 597,
600 (1995) (commenting employees were guaranteed the right of free and collective
bargaining by the NLRA).
24 See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 700 (1965)
(describing conflict between national labor policy and antitrust laws); Textile Workers
Union v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 409, 411 (1955) (stating restraint and coercion of employees by
a union is an unfair labor practice). But see Releasing Superstars From Peonage: Union
Consent and the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REV. 874, (1991)
[hereinafter Releasing Superstars] (illustrating NFL players working through their union
to try and eliminate restraints on their ability to become employed within the league).
25 See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n of N. Amer., 274
U.S. 37, 46 (1927) (holding that attempted labor strikes were restraints on commerce);
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 304 (1908) (proscribing labor union boycotts under
Sherman Act authority); see also Joseph Covelli, Note, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.: At the
Intersection of Antitrust Law and Labor Law, Supreme Court's Decision Gives
Management the Green Light, 27 STETSON L. REV. 257, 266 (1997) (noting impact of
Sherman Act on labor union activities).
26 Clayton Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2004) [hereinafter Clayton Act] (supplementing the
Sherman Act).
27 See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (allowing any person injured by antitrust activity to sue);
Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 376 (1958) (stating that private cause
of action exists for antitrust violations in order to protect trade and commerce); Clarett v.
Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 390 n.69 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2004) (describing
practical effect of Clayton Act).
28 See Clayton Act, supra note 26 (exempting organized labor from antitrust laws); 29
U.S.C. § 52 (2004) (removing labor union activity from Sherman Act examination); 29
U.S.C. §§ 104-05, 113 (2004) (allowing specified union activity freedom from enjoinment
by federal courts).
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The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce. Nothing constrained in the antitrust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor...
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help...
or to forbid or refrain individual members of such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objectives thereof.29
The Supreme Court interpreted this section of the Clayton Act,
in conjunction with the Norris-LaGuardia Act,30 as generally
waiving antitrust liability for labor conduct. 31 However, the
Court limited this exemption by applying it only when labor
unions act in their own interest, and not when conspiring with
non-labor organizations. 32  Therefore the exemption is
conditioned upon the particular actions of the union.33 These
interpretations of the acts have become known as the statutory
labor exemption.34
29 15 U.S.C. § 17 (distinguishing labor from commerce).
30 29 U.S.C. § 104 (2004), which states:
[W]hereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of
governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and
other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is a
commodity helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom
of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment,
wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is
necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and
conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference,
restrain, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of
such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
31 See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 622 (1975) (holding labor unions are exempt from antitrust liability under a
conjunctive reading of the Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act); Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996) (explaining labor exemptions from antitrust scrutiny); Pan
Alaska Trucking v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 621 F. Supp. 800, 803 (D. Alaska 1985)
(declaring labor unions can be exempt from antitrust suits in certain scenarios).
32 See U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 230 (1941) (applying antitrust restrictions to
labor organization attempting to persuade other unions to engage in boycott); U.S. v.
Brims, 272 U.S. 549, 552 (1926) (holding boycott by all union mills against non-union
work was an antitrust violation); Pan Alaska, 621 F. Supp. at 803 (stating there must be
a legitimate union goal to qualify for exemption).
33 See Connell, 421 U.S. at 622-23 (explaining that exemption does not apply when
union and non-labor party agree to restrain competition); United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 661 (1965) (outlining scope of statutory labor exemption);
Covelli, supra note 25, at 270 (stating that scope is limited to parties directly involved in
collective-bargaining relationship).
34 See H.A. Artists & Assoc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 714-15 (1981)
(explaining statutory exemption that labor unions enjoy); Anderson, supra note 3, at 135
(discussing statutory labor exemption); Mirabito, supra note 18, at 832 (noting that
together the Norris-LaGuardia Act and Clayton Act constitute the statutory labor
exemption shielding certain labor activity from antitrust scrutiny).
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B. The Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
On the coattails of the statutory labor exemption, the Supreme
Court assumed that Congress also implicitly exempted concerted
labor activity necessary for collective bargaining. 35 The Court
explained this judicially fashioned immunity:
The non-statutory exemption ... favor[s] the association of
employees to eliminate competition over wages and working
conditions. Union success in organizing workers and
standardizing wages ultimately will affect price competition
among employers, but the goals of federal labor law never
could be achieved if this effect on business competition were
held a violation of the antitrust laws. 36
Collective bargaining that creates uniform wages and working
conditions is encouraged by national labor policy. 37 It has been
left to the courts to square this labor policy with antitrust
concerns. 38 The Supreme Court recognized the conflict, and
stated "it is our responsibility to... reconcile [the two policies]." 39
The Court explicitly assumed the mantle of determining when
35 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 235 (discussing the evolution of non-statutory labor
exemption); NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that non-
statutory exemption prevented antitrust suit based on terms and conditions of
employment); Bryant, supra note 15, at n.41 (relating the non-statutory labor exemption's
creation by the Supreme Court).
36 See Connell, 421 U.S. at 622 (explaining reasoning behind establishment of the
non-statutory labor exemption); see also Anderson, supra note 3, at 136 (relating
development of labor exemptions).
37 See NLRA, supra note 22, at § 158(d) (making wages and working conditions a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining process); Local 509, ILGWU v. Annshire
Garment Co., No. KC-2307, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7768, at *4 (D. Kan. June 30, 1967)
(stating collective bargaining agreements are utilized to "implement a National labor
policy designed to remove certain recognized sources of industrial strife by encouraging
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes as to wages, hours of work and other conditions
of employment, upon a plane of equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees"); cf. NLRA, supra note 22, at § 159 ("[R]epresentatives designated or selected
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.")
38 See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S.
797, 806 (1945) (noting conflict between antitrust and labor concerns); Pennington, 381
U.S. at 663 (observing the Court held collective bargaining agreements may violate the
antitrust laws); cf. Int'l Assoc. of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v. United
Contractors Assoc., 483 F.2d 384, 392 (3rd Cir. 1973) (agreeing with other court decisions
that found collective bargaining agreements may violate Sherman Act).
39 See Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 806 (assuming responsibility for integrating federal
policies).
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the activities favored by one policy counteract the other.40 With
this non-statutory labor exemption, the Court shifted much of the
decision-making authority in the realm of collective bargaining
regulation from Congress to the courts.41 Where and when this
non-statutory labor exemption applies, however, has been a
source of confusion and division among the courts. 42
Three early Supreme Court cases interpreting the non-
statutory labor exemption obscured what was - up to that point -
a straightforward analysis. In Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea Co.,43 the Court required that the subject matter of
employer-employee agreements must be "intimately related to
wages, hours and working conditions" in order to qualify for the
non-statutory labor exemption.44 In Jewel Tea, a meat workers
union entered into agreements with a large trade association to
limit the marketing hours of fresh meat.45 One self-service
market chain, Jewel Tea, refused to enter into the agreement
containing the limit on marketing hours. 46 When the union
threatened to strike, Jewel Tea succumbed and signed the
40 See id. Specifically, the court noted:
We have two declared congressional policies which it is our responsibility to try to
reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive business economy; the other to
preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions through the agency of
collective bargaining. We must determine here how far Congress intended activities
under one of these policies to neutralize the results envisioned by the other.
41 See Bryan A. Wood, Supreme Court Drops the Ball: Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116
S. Ct. 2116 (1996), Highlights the Need to Return Labor's Antitrust Exemption to its
Statutory Origin, 70 TEMPLE L. REV. 321, 322 (1997) (recognizing assumption of
discretionary authority by the Supreme Court in matters of collective bargaining); see also
H.A. Artists & Assoc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 714 (1981) (stating "the courts
must not use the antitrust laws as a vehicle to interfere in labor disputes"); cf. Milk
Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prod., Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 103 (1940) (declaring
jurisdiction to grant injunctions in labor dispute cases which allege Sherman Act
violations "would run counter to the plain mandate of the Act and would reverse the
declared purpose of Congress").
42 See Bryant, supra note 15, at n.45 (describing nebulous boundaries of the non-
statutory labor exemption); Wood, supra note 41, at 322 (mentioning uncertainty of cases
reconciling antitrust and labor policies); cf. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local Union-No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975) (stating "the Court therefore
has acknowledged that labor policy requires tolerance for the lessening of business
competition based on differences in wages and working conditions").
43 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (announcing application of the non-statutory labor exemption
to agreement between a union and trade association regarding operating hours).
44 Id. at 689 (holding the particular hours of the day and days of the week that
workers must report are within terms and conditions of employment that unions and
employers must negotiate).
45 Id. at 679-80 (noting that representatives of thousands of Chicago meat retailers
and seven union petitioners entered into a contract in 1957 outlining working hours).
46 Id. at 680 (explaining that during negotiations Amalgamated Meat rejected all
counteroffers made by Jewel Tea and authorized its union members to strike).
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agreement. 47 Jewel Tea then brought suit against the union,
arguing that the limitation on hours in the agreement inhibited
its ability to compete in the market.48 The Court held that the
non-statutory labor exemption waived antitrust liability in this
case; however, the exemption was not applied automatically
because the agreement dealt with working hours. 49 The Court
subjectively analyzed the competing labor and antitrust policies
implicated by the particular facts. 50 By employing this balancing
test, the Court held that labor agreement items like wages,
hours, or working conditions, were not perfunctorily exempted
from antitrust scrutiny.51
In United Mine Workers v. Pennington,52 the companion case to
Jewel Tea, the Court exercised an even greater level of discretion
when determining whether the non-statutory labor exemption
removed particular labor actions from antitrust scrutiny.53 In
Pennington, the Court examined a collective bargaining
agreement struck between a mine worker's union and a number
of coal producers. 54 The union agreed to help develop mechanical
technology that would have the practical result of job loss for the
mine workers, in return for wage increases. 55 The union agreed
47 Id. at 681 (stating that Jewel Tea signed the union-proposed agreements under
duress).
48 Id. (describing Jewel Tea's complaint as alleging conspiracy by union
representatives to prevent them from selling meat during certain hours).
49 Id. at 688 (holding the agreement was exempt from antitrust scrutiny, but on
narrower terms than proposed by union).
50 Id. at 689 (explaining the Court's consideration of agreement's subject matter in
light of national labor policy); see also Wood, supra note 41, at 333 (describing the Court
as taking a subjective approach to the analysis).
51 Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90, stating that:
The issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours restriction, like wages, and
unlike prices, is so intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions that the
unions' successful attempt to obtain that provision through bona-fide, arm's length
bargaining in pursuit of their own labor union policies, and not at the behest of or in
combination with non-labor groups, falls within the protection of the national labor
policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act. We think that it is.
52 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 659 (1965).
53 See Raymond Krauze & John Mulcahy, Antitrust Violations, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
241, 264 (2003) (describing the role of Pennington in exemptions from antitrust liability);
James Perrine, Defining the "Sham Litigation" Exception to the Noerr-Pennington
Antitrust Immunity Doctrine: An Analysis of the Professional Real Estate Investors v.
Columbia Pictures Industries Decision, 46 ALA. L. REV. 815, 821 (1995) (discussing the
reasoning of the Pennington Court); Wood, supra note 41, at 334 (addressing the "negative
approach" taken by the Pennington Court).
54 See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 659 (relating that provisions in controversy were found
in National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950).
55 See id. at 660 (explaining that mine workers' union allegedly "abandoned its efforts
to control working time of miners, agreed not to oppose rapid mechanization of mines
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to impose the same terms on other small companies as well.56
Smaller coal companies, however, had less ability to support the
wage increases. 57 These smaller coal companies brought suit,
asserting that the agreement would put them out of business and
suppress competition in the coal industry.58 The Court held that
an agreement among a series of employers could not impose wage
and working condition restrictions on another unrelated group of
employers. 59 In its analysis, the Court once again subjectively
evaluated the labor policies implicated by the particular set of
facts.60 Upon deciding that labor law did not conflict with its
conclusion, the Court restated the proposition that negotiation
over mandatory terms to labor agreements did not imply an
automatic labor exemption.61 The Court also held that the
exemption did not apply to wage agreements imposed on
employers who were not party to the original collective
bargaining agreement. 62 In concert, Pennington and Jewel Tea
marked the expansion of judicial discretion when applying the
non-statutory labor exemption.63 The scope of this discretion was
which would substantially reduce mine employment, agreed to help finance such
mechanization and agreed to impose terms of 1950 agreement on all operators without
regard to their ability to pay").
56 See id. (stating "[the union] ... agreed to impose the terms of the 1950 agreement
on all operators without regard to their ability to pay").
57 See id. at 664 (describing contention that union and large coal operators had
entered into a conspiracy to impose wage-scales upon smaller operators in an effort to
drive them from market).
58 See id. (iterating allegations that imposition of the wage-scale would pre-empt
market for large, unionized operators).
59 See id. at 665 (holding wage scales are integral to collective bargaining but the
effect of imposing wage scales would eliminate competition, an act barred by Sherman
Act).
60 See id. at 667 (concluding that national labor policy provided no support for the
kind of agreement at bar).
61 See id. at 666 (stating that national labor policy does not allow one bargaining unit
to determine wages or working conditions for other bargaining units or entire industry).
62 See id. (opining that union's members would derive greater benefit from ability to
bargain individually with each bargaining unit on a case by case basis).
63 See id. at 665 (stating "a union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws when
it is clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage
scale on other bargaining units"); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676, 714-15 (1965) (holding that a court could subject both unions and employers to
antitrust criminal and civil sanctions, if in collective bargaining, it concluded the union
"has undertaken to use its best efforts" to have specific wage accepted by other employers
in the industry). See generally Wood, supra note 41, at 331-32 (claiming that Supreme
Court began to "infer that agreements between employers and employees concerning
terms and conditions of employment implicitly were exempt from antitrust liability").
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patently broader than that previously used in statutory labor
exemption situations.64
Finally, in Connell Construction Company v. Plumbers and
Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,65 the Supreme Court
attempted to delineate an appropriate analysis for non-statutory
labor exemption cases that would be more analogous to the
examination conducted in statutory labor exemption
circumstances. 66 In Connell, a trade union entered into an
agreement with employer contractors that restricted those
contractors from hiring subcontractors not affiliated with the
union.67 Contractor Connell refused to sign the agreement, and
the union caused a work stoppage at a job site. 68 Connell signed
the agreement under pressure and afterward brought a suit
against the union, arguing that the restriction between
contractors and subcontractors stifled competition. 69 The Court,
now formally acknowledging the existence of the non-statutory
labor exemption articulated in Jewel Tea and Pennington,
determined the outcome by once again subjectively analyzing the
conflicting policies at work in the light of the particular facts of
64 See Wood, supra note 41, at 335 (noting that use of the non-statutory labor
exemption in Jewel Tea and Pennington increasingly supplanted legislative intent for
judicial discretion). See generally Scott A. Rosner, Must Kobe Come Out and Play? An
Analysis of the Legality Preventing High School Athletes and College Underclassmen from
Entering Professional Sport Drafts, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 539, 547 (1998) (positing
that in addition to the statutory labor exemption, courts had created non-statutory labor
exemption, attempting to reconcile adverse policies of labor and antitrust laws); Jessica
Cohen, Note, Sharing the Wealth: Don't Call Us. We'll Call You: Why Revenue Sharing is
a Permissive Subject and Therefore the Labor Exemption Does Not Apply, 12 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 609, 622 (2002) (stating that non-statutory labor
exemption was created by the Supreme Court to "extend the labor exemption to collective
bargaining activities not covered in the statutes").
65 421 U.S. 616 (1975) (discussing case where building trades union picketed general
contractors who refused to be parties to its collective bargaining agreement and hire only
subcontractors affiliated with union).
66 See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 635 (1975) (holding that agreement was not immune under non-statutory labor
exemption and was subject to antitrust scrutiny because "it has a potential for restraining
competition in the business market in ways that would not follow naturally from
elimination of competition over wages and working conditions").
67 See id. at 619 (stating that, in 1970, union Local 100 asked general contractor
Connell to subcontract work only to firms that had signed contracts with union).
68 See id. at 620 (describing that following Connell's refusal to sign agreement, union
staged a picket at one of Connell's major construction sites causing 150 workers to leave
site).
69 See id. (noting that Connell signed the agreement demanded by union under
protest).
588 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:3
Connell.70 The Court held that the agreement between the
contractor and the union suppressed competition on all labor
subjects, and therefore the bargain was not exempted from
antitrust scrutiny. 71 In each of the three cases, Jewel Tea,
Pennington and Connell, the Court analyzed the facts of each
situation by affording weight to the relevant federal policies as it
saw fit.72 This subjective analysis allowed for a great deal more
flexibility in the application of the non-statutory labor exemption,
as compared to the relatively rigid use of the formal statutory
exemption. 73 As such, the elasticity of the exemption does not
allow for predictability, and potentially substitutes judicial
interpretation for legislative intent.74
The non-statutory labor exemption has been applied to
collective bargaining in professional sports league employment
cases; however, the scope and breadth of the exemption has
varied widely.75 The Sixth and Eighth Circuits have each
70 See id. at 622 (recognizing non-statutory labor exemption outlined in Jewel Tea
and Pennington favoring free competition in business markets); see also See United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965) (establishing a non-statutory labor
exemption from antitrust laws); Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965)
(stating that there is a statutory exemption for union-employer agreements).
71 See Connell, 421 U.S. at 623 (holding that Local 100 directly restrained market to
improve its organizing campaign, and curtailment of competition to aid efficiency is not a
goal of labor or antitrust policy).
72 See Wood, supra note 41, at 334 (comparing Justice Powell's analysis in Connell to
Justice White's in Pennington and Jewel Tea). See generally D. Albert Daspin, Note, Of
Hoops, Labor Dupes and Antitrust Ally.Oops: Fouling Out the Salary Cap, 62 IND. L.J. 95,
104 (1986) (explaining the holdings of Jewel Tea, Connell and Pennington); Rosner, supra
note 64, at 548 (claiming that in Pennington, Jewel Tea and Connell, the Court was
concerned more "with product market restraints than labor market restraints").
73 See Wood, supra note 41, at 335 (noting the use of non-statutory labor exemption
allows Court freedom to determine relative importance of competition labor and antitrust
policies). See generally Rosner, supra note 64, at 559 (claiming that non-statutory labor
exemption has become collective bargaining exemption); Cohen, supra note 64, at 622
(stating that court had created non-statutory labor exemption to extend labor exemptions
to collective bargaining activities usually not covered in statutes).
74 See Wood, supra note 41, at 335 (contrasting the strict analysis used in statutory
labor exemption cases to unpredictable discretion employed in non-statutory labor
exemption cases); see also Cohen, supra note 64, at 614 (recognizing that non-statutory
labor laws may be in conflict with each other and require careful scrutiny); Jonathan C.
Tyras, Comment, Players Versus Owners: Collective Bargaining and Antitrust After
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 297, 315 (1998) (stating there is
significant scholarly and judicial disagreement on when non-statutory labor "exemption
expires and the practice again becomes subject to antitrust scrutiny").
75 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 344 (commenting how the application of the statutory
and non-statutory labor exemption in sports league cases is in need of elucidation). See
generally Wood, supra note 41, at 334-35 (establishing that the Jewel Tea and Pennington
holdings created non-statutory labor exemption, use of which allows court to determine
"appropriate weight with which to afford any particular policy"); Cohen, supra note 64, at
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adopted a three-part test to control the application of the
exemption:
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may
potentially be given pre-eminence over the antitrust laws
where the restraint on trade primarily affects only the
parties to the collective bargaining relationship. Second,
federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail only
where the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Finally, the
policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to the
degree necessary to override antitrust laws only where the
agreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona-fide
arm's length bargaining.76
While echoing the rationale alluded to in previous non-
statutory exemption cases, these two circuits employ a standard
that is much more complicated than the one enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Jewel Tea.77 Simply, the Court held that the
appropriate test is one that "balances the conflicting policies
embodied in the labor and antitrust laws, with the policies
inherent in labor law serving as the first point of reference." 78
However, as the years have progressed, the Supreme Court itself
has pushed the limits of the application of the exemption. In a
widely criticized 1996 decision, the Supreme Court applied the
non-statutory labor exemption to an expired collective bargaining
agreement between the National Football League and aggrieved
players. 79 The holding in Brown v. Pro Football Inc.80 extended
625 (reminding that courts had numerous opportunities to test scope of non-statutory
labor exemption in context of professional sports industry).
76 Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (1976); see also Clarett v.
National Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 399 (2004) (quoting the Eight Circuit in
Mackey). See generally McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1997-98 (6th Cir.
1979).
77 See Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 681 (1965) (explaining balancing
test between antitrust and labor laws); NFL Rule Barring Player From Entering Draft
After One Year of College Violates Antitrust Laws, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 2004, at 24 (quoting
balancing test cited in Jewel Tea); Michael Cozzillio, Sports Owners' Stand on Player
Mobility Puts Ball in Courts, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 23, 1987, at 20 (noting the Supreme
Court identified the need in Jewel Tea to accommodate tension between antitrust and
labor policies).
78 Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 625 (1975).
79 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250 (holding that labor policy waived antitrust liability for
competition restraints achieved through the collective bargaining process so long as those
restraints functioned in labor market characterized by collective bargaining). See
generally Jeffrey A. Rosenthal, The NBA Lockout: Is Union Decertification the Next Step?,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 20, 1998, at 5 (noting that as a result of Brown "leagues have found
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the exemption far beyond predictable boundaries, and potentially
opened the door for employers like the NFL to claim the
exemption in cases where it would not have been previously
implicated. 81
In 2004, the NFL claimed such immunity when Maurice
Clarett challenged a draft regulation under antitrust law.8 2
Clarett v. National Football League83 called upon the courts to
determine whether the non-statutory exemption applied to the
draft eligibility rule unilaterally imposed by the NFL.84
III. CLARETT V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
A. Defensive Formation: The NFL
In 1895, the first professional football game in the United
States took place in the town of Latrobe, Pennsylvania.8 5 In
themselves virtually immune from antitrust challenge by their players"); Supreme Court
Rules That NFL Teams Did Not Violate Antitrust Laws by Agreeing on Uniform Salary for
Practice Squad Players, After Impasse in Collective Bargaining with Players'Association,
ENTERTAINMENT LAW REPORTER, July 1996, at 1 (noting that Supreme Court offered no
apology for its decision to strengthen the position of employers at expense of employees).
80 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (describing NFL's unilateral imposition of contract changes on
players following impasse in collective bargaining as immune from antitrust scrutiny).
81 See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing far reaches of Brown decision). See
generally Pamela Clark, supra note 20, at 571 (noting Supreme Court's expansion of non-
statutory labor exemption's scope to immunize from antitrust liability post impasse
contract terms unilaterally imposed by employers); Tony Mauro, Scrimmaging and
Scrapping with the NLRB, CONN. L. TRIB., Apr. 15, 1996, at 14 (stating the Supreme
Court takes an expansive view of exemption which may do more harm than good).
82 See discussion infra Part III (discussing Clarett's challenge under antitrust law);
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 390 n.64 (challenging NFL provision requiring a player to be
out of high school for at least three years). See generally Lewis Kurlantzick, An NFL
Policy is Challenged as a Matter of Labor Law, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 2004, at 4 (stating that
Clarett took issue with the NFL bylaw that prohibits player from entering the draft until
he has been out of high school for at least three years).
83 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (2004).
84 See id. at 390 (discussing Clarett's allegations against NFL); Eriq Gardner, Can the
NFL Hold Him?; Pro Football's Lawyers Try to Stop Maurice Clarett from Making an End
Run Around its Labor Pact, CORP. COUNS., Jan. 2004, at 17 (stating Clarett filed suit
demanding that he be included in next draft in April 2004); Tom Perrotta, NFL Draft
Rule is Found to Violate Antitrust Laws, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 2004, at 1 (noting that Clarett
sued to join NFL year earlier than he would normally be eligible).
85 See generally Chronology of Professional Football, at http://www.footballinjuries.
com/prohistory.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Chronology of Professional
Football] (discussing history of football); Football History Chronology, at
http://www.bestofcolumbus.comn/fussichenlotdFoot.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2004)
[hereinafter Football History Chronology] (establishing football timeline); NFL Team
History, at http://www.nflhistoryguide.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2004) [hereinafter NFL
Team History] (explaining professional football and NFL history).
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1920, the American Professional Football Association (AFPA)
formed the first league of professional football teams.8 6 The
teams pledged not to use any student player who still had college
eligibility left, as staunch college support was believed essential
to the survival of the fledgling professional league.8 7 In 1922, the
AFPA gave way to the National Football League.8 8 The early
NFL game was essentially equivalent to college football during
that time.8 9 Professional football enticed large numbers of
excellent college players, and the increased patronage made the
league economically viable. 90
The 1950s brought about increased fan interest and,
consequently, greater revenue. 91 This change impacted players'
salaries, television coverage and stadium size. 92 Seeing that a
86 See generally Chronology of Professional Football, supra note 85 (noting teams that
were members of AFPA); History of NFL Football - American Style, at http://www.all-
sports-posters.com/history-of-the-nfl.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2004) [hereinafter
American Style] (discussing formation of AFPA); History of the NFL, at
http://library.thinkquest.org/12590/history.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2004) [hereinafter
History of the NFL] (reviewing formation of AFPA).
87 See generally American Style, supra note 86 (noting early professional football's
dependence on college football); Chronology of Professional Football, supra note 85
(discussing early rule of not allowing players on teams who still had college eligibility);
History of the NFL, supra note 86 (stating that student players with remaining college
eligibility would not be used).
88 See African American Head Coaches, THE TENNESSEAN, Feb. 19, 2003, at 3C
(noting that AFPA became the NFL in 1922); Today's History, THE DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 17, 2000, at 2A (stating that AFPA was the precursor of the NFL); American Style,
supra note 86 (discussing emergence of the NFL).
89 See American Style, supra note 86 (comparing early professional football to college
football in terms of rules and structure); Robert E. Schnakenberg, NFL History, ST. JAMES
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POP CULTURE, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-
glepc/is -tov/ai_2419100866 (last visited Nov. 8, 2004) (noting that in its early years NFL
had to compete with college football). But see Lee Grace, You Make the Call: 2002 NCAA-
NFL Rules Differences, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 19, 2002, at 1 (presenting
the differences in rules that now exist between the NFL and NCAA).
90 See American Style, supra note 86 (remarking on the relationship between college
football players and revenue growth of professional football); see also NFL History, at
http://www.nfl.com/history/chronology/1921-1930 (last visited Nov. 8, 2004) [hereinafter
NFL History] (noting that popularity of professional football was growing with crowds as
large as 75,000 watching the games); Bob Gill, 1924: Providence Starts Rolling, Prof l
Researchers Ass'n, at http://www.footballresearch.com/articles/frpage.cfm?topic=provroll
(last visited Nov. 8, 2004) (stating that college players entered the NFL in return for high
salaries).
91 See generally American Style, supra note 86 (noting growth of the NFL); see also
NFL History, supra note 90 (stating the introduction of coast to coast broadcasting of NFL
games also reinforced popularity and revenues for the NFL); Schnakenberg, supra note 89
(discussing the significant growth in NFL's popularity during the 1950's).
92 See NFL History, supra note 90 (noting that CBS was the first television stations to
broadcast regular season games in 1956); Pro Football Draft History, at
http://www.profootballhof.com/index.cfm?section=history&contid=187312 (last visited,
Apr. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Pro Football Draft History] (discussing increases in wages and
coverage of professional football as fan interest increased). See generally Schnakenberg,
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profit could be made from professional football, Texas
businessman Lamar Hunt formed the American Football League
(AFL) in 1960, as a rival to the NFL.93 The two leagues fiercely
fought for revenue, players and media attention.94 Following a
$10 million dollar antitrust suit brought by the AFL against the
NFL in 1966, the two leagues agreed on a merger. 95 In 1970, the
two leagues merged into two 13-team conferences under the NFL
name.
96
Throughout the 1970s, NFL viewership continued to rise.97
Super Bowl XII was viewed by more that 102 million people. 98 In
1980, when the Pittsburgh Steelers met the Los Angeles Rams in
supra note 89 (stating the 1958 NFL championship game had set a record by attracting
more television viewers than any other sporting event).
93 See Tom Fitzgerald, Top of the Sixth, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Dec. 7, 1995, at
D6 (noting that a rivalry existed between the NFL and AFL); Bill Foley, Jacksonville Had
Big Supporter in AFL Quest, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Oct. 27, 1999, at A2 (stating that Hunt
decided to organize the AFL after several failed attempts to create his own NFL
franchise); Pro Football Draft History, supra note 92 (commenting on NFL competition
and rival league development).
94 See Gary Mihoces, Principals Mark Key Moment Quietly, USA TODAY, June 6,
1991, at 10C (positing war existed between AFL and NFL prior to their merger); Bruce
Nichols, Making the Call, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 16, 1995, at 1A (noting that
the AFL managed to successfully compete with NFL for players, revenues and fans); Pro
Football Draft History, supra note 92 (describing lengths taken by the NFL and AFL to
compete for revenue and fan interest).
95 See generally AFL-NFL Merger, at http://www.worldhistory.com/wiki/A/AFL-NFL-
Merger.htm (last visited May 30, 2004) (describing competition conditions leading to the
merger of the AFL and NFL); Bob Carter, Rozelle Made the NFL What it is Today, at
http://espn.go.com/classic/biography/s/RozellePete.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2004)
(portraying the life of Pete Rozelle and his role in the merger of the AFL and NFL); Pete
Rozelle, The Football Archive, ThinkQuest, at http://library.thinkquest.org/12590/rozelle.
htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2004) (noting AFL antitrust suit brought against the NFL
resulted in the merger of the two leagues).
96 See On This Date, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 10, 2000, at 9 (noting that the new NFL
consisted of the AFC and NFC conferences); Sportlight: May 10, DESERT NEWS, May 10,
2002, at D7 (stating that after the merger the NFL consisted of two conferences each
consisting of thirteen teams). See generally The History of the NFL, at
http://www.nflfootballhistory.net/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2004) (discussing post-merger
character of the NFL).
97 See Schnakenberg, supra note 89 (noting that NFL popularity was very significant
during the 1970's and television viewership increased due to ABC's contract to broadcast
Monday Night Football); NFL History, supra note 90 (stating the broadcast of Super Bowl
VI was the highest rated telecast ever); The NFL in the 1970's, at
http://www.nflfootballhistory.net/70.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2004) (emphasizing the
effect of television and Monday Night Football broadcasts in NFL's popularity).
98 See Dan Horn, What's Not to Like About the Deal?, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 11,
2004 (noting rising fan interest in the NFL in the 1970s), available at
http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2004/03/11/loc-nflsuitq&all.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2004); Danny Sheridan, The Inside Track: In Super Bowls Past, NFC Teams Have Owned
Dome-Field Advantage, PETERSEN PUB. Co., Feb. 1992, at 86 (reaffirming that 102 million
viewers watched Super Bowl XII). But see Super Viewing Record Set, FACTS ON FILE
WORLD NEWS DIG., Jan. 20, 1978 (stating an estimated 86 million people watched Super
Bowl XII).
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Super Bowl XIV, more than 35 million homes tuned in.99 As a
result, television and radio contracts continued to grow. In 1980,
CBS paid the NFL $12 million for the rights to regular and post
season games, 100 and, in 1981, NFL games set all-time ratings
highs for both ABC and NBC.101 In 1989, Paul Tagliabue became
the seventh chief executive of the NFL.102 That same year, the
NFL's paid attendance was over $17 million, the highest in NFL
history. 103
Currently, the NFL is an unincorporated association of thirty-
two teams.104 While other professional football leagues exist in
the form of Arena Football Leagues 1 and 2, the Canadian
99 See Horn, supra note 98 (commenting on Super Bowl XIV); Sports Has Super
Impact on TV's Highest Ranking Programs, VARIETY, July 24, 2000 (listing Super Bowl
XIV as one of the highest rated television programs); Super Bowl: Facts and Figures,
UNITED PRESS INVL, Jan. 26, 1983 at 1 (noting that Super Bowl XIV was the most
watched American sporting event).
100 See General History - Chronology (1980 to 1999), Pro Football Hall of Fame, at
http://www.profootballhof.com/history/general/chronology/1980-1999.jsp (last visited Oct.
31, 2004) [hereinafter General History - Chronology] (clarifying what CBS received for its
$12 million record bid); NFL History 1971 - 1980, The National Football League, at
http://www.nfl.com/history/chronology/1971-1980 (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) [hereinafter
NFL History 1971- 1980] (stating that CBS's $12 million bid secured radio rights to "26
NFL regular-season games, including Monday Night Football, and all 10 postseason
games for the 1980-83 seasons"). See generally Cindi Andrews & Dan Horn, County Joins
Stadium Suit, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 11, 2004, at 1A (examining NFL growing
television contract revenues).
101 See General History - Chronology, supra note 100 (noting that ABC and CBS
experienced all time rating highs in 1981); NFL History 1981 - 1990, supra note 100
(announcing that NFL brought both ABC and CBS all-time rating highs of 21.7 and 17.5,
respectively, in 1981). See generally Andrews & Horn, supra note 100, at IA (describing
television ratings in major markets for televised NFL games).
102 See Michael Wilbon, NFL Names Tagliabue as Rozelle's Successor; Washington
Lawyer Elected After All-Night Talks by 5-Man Panel, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1989, at Al
(conveying that Tagliabue was elected commissioner following seven months of debate);
NFL History 1981 - 1990, The National Football League, at http://www.nfl.comhistory/
chronology/1981-1990 (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) [hereinafter NFL History 1981 - 1990]
(depicting circumstances surrounding Tagliabue's appointment). See generally Gary
Graves, Law Firm Loses Tremendously Able Man, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1989, at C8
(reiterating one statement by Jeff Pash, a colleague of Tagliabue, that Tagliabue was "one
of the leaders" who "had universal respect ... in a number of positions").
103 See Peter King, Inside the NFL; Maximum Parity, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 20,
1989, at 112 (suggesting that NFL attendance record of 60,745 fans per game from 1981
was endangered by an increased turnout in 1989); see also General History - Chronology,
supra note 100 (asserting that $17,399,531 was the "highest total in league history"); NFL
History 1981 - 1990, supra note 102 (highlighting increased gate revenue for NFL games).
104 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382-83 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
5, 2004) (explaining the NFL's current structure); see also American Football History, at
http://wiwi.essortment.com/americanfootbalrwff.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004)
(summarizing the NFL's evolution up to its present state of eight divisions, each
consisting of four teams); NFL Teams, The National Football League, at
http://www.nfl.com/teams (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) (outlining organization of NFL
teams).
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Football League and the National Indoor Football League, the
NFL far and away prevails in size and revenue.10 5 In addition,
the NFL has consistently higher revenue than all other
professional sports as well.106  Specifically, NFL television
contract rights, valued at nearly $7 billion, are greater than
professional baseball, basketball and hockey combined.10 7 The
success of the NFL led players to demand a piece of the action.
Free agency emerged in 1992 following the settlement of a
1987 lawsuit brought by the NFL Players Association.O8 A
salary cap currently accompanies free agency limiting teams to a
maximum annual player payroll.109 In 2003 the average player
salary neared one million dollars,110 and the minimum rookie
105 See Arena Football League, at http://www.arenafootball.com (last visited Oct. 31,
2004) (promoting Arena Football); Canadian Football League, at http://www.cfl.ca (last
visited Oct. 31, 2004) (endorsing Canadian Football League); National Indoor Football
League, at http://www.nationalindoorfootballleague.net (last visited Oct. 31, 2004)
(relating information about National Indoor Football League).
106 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 383 n.6 (declaring that the NFL is worth
approximately $18 billion while the NBA, MLB and NHL are valued at roughly $9 billion,
$7 billion and $5 billion, respectively); Dave Perkins, It's Just a Fluke that NFL Became a
Role Model, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 8, 2003, at E03 (emphasizing that "[rJevenue-sharing,
the pooling of the immense network TV fees that all but assure every NFL team operates
at a profit before the first ticket is sold, coupled with the NFL's strong salary cap, make
the NFL the role model for the rest of the sports world"). See generally Alan Snel, Family
Fun Doesn't Come Cheap, TAMPA TRIB. (Florida), Sept. 12, 2004, at 1 (stressing high costs
of attending football games and describing several sources of revenue).
107 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 383 (comparing football television revenues with
revenue of other sports); Nottingham, supra note 6, at 1071 (maintaining that the NFL
television contract is much more lucrative than that of the NHL). See generally Gerald R.
Scully, Sports, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, at http://www.econlib.org/library/
Enc/Sports.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) (proposing that in particular, football
programming is extremely valuable because football games attract large audiences).
108 See Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1295-97 (8th Cir. 1989)
(expounding events which lead to settlement and free agency in the NFL). See generally
Football, MSN Encarta, at http://encarta.msn.com/encnetrefpages/RefArticle.aspx?refid=
761557873&pn=3 (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) (explicating emergence of free agency in the
NFL); 1992: Settlement Talks Begin, National Football League Players Association, at
http://www.nflpa.org/aboutus/main.asp?section=1992%3A+Settlement+Talks+Begin&sub
page=History&x=18&y=5 (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) (reviewing contents of settlement
negotiations and emergence of free agency).
109 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 383-84 (discussing NFL salaries); Steven Kolias,
Offensive Interference: How Communities Have Harnessed Market Forces to Retain NFL
Franchises, Eliminating the Need for H.R. 3817's Proposed Antitrust Exemption, 8 SPORTS
LAW. J. 43, 45 (2001) (articulating that salary cap "places an upper limit on spending for
players' salaries" and thus "prevents big-spending teams from hoarding the best talent...
[and] enable[s] teams with more modest spending habits to compete"). See generally John
Clayton, Salary Cap Status of All 32 Teams, at http://espn.go.com/nfl/columns/clayton-
johnl510617.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) (disclosing how much each team is under or
over the 2004 NFL salary cap of approximately $80.5 million).
110 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 383 n.9 (quoting NFLPA research which states the
average 2003 salary as $1,258,800); NFL Salary Database, at http://asp.usatoday.com
sports/footballlnflsalaries/default.aspx (last visited May 25, 2004) (listing all NFL player
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salary in 2004 is $230,000.111 The average player salary in the
NFL could nearly fund entire teams in competing football
associations. 112 Consequently, the NFL affords opportunities for
prospective football players unmatched by any other outlet. 113
B. The Draft
In the early years of the NFL, players were free to sign with
any club.114 In 1935 the league owners adopted a plan for a
college player draft. 115 The first draft had nine rounds, which
increased over the years from ten in 1937 to twenty rounds in
salaries). See generally Ross Siler, Winning Title Not Avengers' Only Job; After Playoffs,
Most Players Will go to Offseason Work, DAILY NEWS OF LOS ANGELES, May 31, 2003, at
S1 (proclaiming that the NFL's average salary of $1.123 million in 2002 was "more than
26 times the average household income of $42,228, as calculated by the Census Bureau
and close to the AFL salary cap of $1.63 million for entire 25-man teams").
111 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 383 (revealing rookie salaries in 2003); Teneshia L.
Wright, Picked Late of Not at All?; The Money is Better for Low-Round Picks, but
Undrafted Free Agents Often Have Better Opportunities, FL. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville),
Apr. 21, 2004, at E-1 (recognizing the minimum 2004 NFL rookie salary at $230,000 and
also noting that "a player doesn't see that money unless he makes the regular-season
roster"). See generally Rookie Salary Pool, Oakland Raiders, at http://www.vertgame.coml
rookie-pool.html (last visited May 27, 2004) (affirming that the minimum 2004 rookie
salary is $230,000).
112 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126 (noting NFL's preeminence over other North
American football leagues). Compare NFL Salary Database, USA TODAY, at
http://asp.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/salaries/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2004)
(listing all NFL player salaries) with Arena Football League Term Sheet, Arena Football
League Players Ass'n, at http://www.aflplayers.org/documents/AFLtermsheet.pdf (last
visited Oct. 31, 2004) (stating team revenues in Arena Football League).
113 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126 (positing NFL football players have greater
opportunities for higher salary, endorsement deals, stronger competition and publicity).
Compare Liz Mullen, Complex Deals for 2004 NFL Rookie Class, SPORTSBUSINESS
JOURNAL, Aug. 9, 2004, (discussing 2004 salaries of certain NFL rookies), available at
http://www.prosportsgroup.com/SportsAgentNews/Aug2004/News/nflrookies.html (last
visited Nov. 8, 2004) with Collective Bargaining in the 1990s, Canadian Football League
Players Association, at http://www.cflpa.comCFLPA/history_1990s.html (last visited Oct.
31, 2004) (setting forth salary minimums for Canadian Football League players) and
Arena Football League Term Sheet, Arena Football League Players Association, at
http://www.aflplayers.org/documents/AFLtermsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2004)
(noting rookie salary in Arena Football League).
114 See Gil Brandt, The Evolution of the Draft, National Football League, at
http://www.nfl.comlce/feature/0,3783,5193297,00.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2004)
(discussing means of acquiring players in 1930s); The NFL Draft, NFL History Network,
at http://nflhistory.net/sharedldraft.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) [hereinafter The NFL
Draft] (noting that NFL teams could sign any desirable college player prior to
establishment of draft); Pro Football Draft History: The 1930s, Pro Football Hall of Fame,
at http://www.profootballhof.com/history/general/draft/1930s.jsp (last visited Oct. 30,
2004) [hereinafter Pro Football Draft History: The 1930s] (recounting beginnings of
professional football).
115 See The NFL Draft, supra note 114 (discussing first NFL draft); Pro Football Draft
History: The 1930s, supra note 114 (remarking on organization of first college draft);
Brandt, supra note 114 (noting that draft format was first announced in 1935).
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1939.116 During the NFL and AFL battle of the 1960s, there was
stiff competition to sign important players from the college
draft.117 To thwart its competition the NFL held a secret early
draft in 1960 to beat the AFL in signing players.118 This secrecy
continued throughout the first half of the decade, highlighted by
the common practice of "kidnapping" prospects.119 In 1967, two
leagues agreed to hold a joint draft as part of the merger
agreement that saw the NFL and AFL become one league.120
Players began to improve their labor situation during the late
1980s and, in 1989, the threat of a lawsuit prompted the NFL to
change its original policy and allow certain college
undergraduates to enter the draft.121 "Juniors and third-year
sophomores [were] now eligible, and many college stars turned
professional before exhausting their college eligibility."122
116 See Brandt, supra note 114 (accounting for number of rounds in NFL draft in 1937
and 1939); The NFL Draft, supra note 114 (noting fluctuating number of draft rounds
over time); Pro Football Draft: The 19301s, supra note 114 (examining evolution and
growth of college draft).
117 See Mickey Herskowitz, Winning the Big I, National Football League, at
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/6702618 (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) (mentioning rivalry
between NFL and AFL throughout 1960s); The NFL Draft, supra note 114 (describing
tactics employed by leagues to draft best players); Pro Football Draft History: The 1960s,
Pro Football Hall of Fame, at http://www.profootballhof.comlhistory/general draft/
1960s.jsp (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) [hereinafter Pro Football Draft History: The 1960s]
(noting various means by which AFL and NFL competed for best talent from college pool).
118 See The NFL Draft, supra note 114 (noting secret draft held very early in 1960
season); Pro Football Draft History: The 1960s, supra note 117 (stating that NFL held
secret draft to sign players before AFL could). See generally Herskowitz, supra note 117
(describing competition and rivalry between leagues prior to first Super Bowl).
119 See Pro Football Draft History: The 1960s, supra note 117 (relating how teams
held players in hotels until drafted, thereby increasing chance that their league would
sign them); The NFL Draft, supra note 114 (noting how both leagues began drafting
players not yet eligible to play professionally, simply to prevent future ability of other
league to draft them). See generally Herskowitz, supra note 117 (depicting hostile
relations between NFL and AFL in 1960s).
120 See Brandt, supra note 114 (stating that combined draft resulted from league
merger); NFL History: 1961-1970, National Football League, at http://www.nfl.com
history/chronology/1961-1970 (last visited Nov. 1, 2004) (noting agreement of NFL and
AFL to hold combined draft in 1967); Pro Football Draft History: The 1960s, supra note
117 (discussing merger of NFL and AFL drafts).
121 See NFL Team History, at http://www.nflhistoryguide.com (last visited Oct. 31,
2004) (noting NFL's change in eligibility requirements after lawsuit threat). See also NFL
Draft By the Numbers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 17, 2001, at http://sportsillustrated.
cnn.com/statitudes/news/2001/04/16/nfldraftbtn (noting undergraduate eligibility as of
1989; NFL History: 1981-1990, supra note 102 (noting NFL's revisions for 1990 draft
eligibility).
122 See NFL Team History, supra note 85 (noting change in eligibility requirement
from four to three years in college and asserting that many college players become
professional although still eligible to play in college); see also NFL Draft by the Numbers,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 17, 2001, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/statitudes/news/
2001/04/16/nfldraftbtn (stating that 264 college underclassmen were drafted from 1989-
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C. The Draft Eligibility Rule
In 1993, the NFL Managers Association (NFLMA) and the
NFL Players Association (NFLPA) entered into a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA).123 A side memorandum executed
on the same day as the CBA acknowledged that the league
constitution and bylaws attached to the memo were referenced in
the CBA.124 Certain provisions of the 1993 NFL bylaws make
reference to the eligibility of players.125 Essentially the bylaws
stated that a player was eligible if he was five years removed
from his first enrollment in college or four years removed from
high school if he never played college football.126 In addition, a
player not eligible could be granted "Special Eligibility."127
Specifically:
2001); NFL History: 1981-1990, supra note 102 (mentioning that eligibility was extended
to college juniors in 1990).
123 See Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n v. Pro Football, Inc. 56 F.3d 1525, 1526
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (discussing collective bargaining agreement signed between National
Football League Players Association and National Football League Management Council);
NFL History: 1991-2000, National Football League, at http://www.nfl.com/history/
chronology/1991-2000 (last visited Nov. 1, 2004) (noting collective bargaining agreement
officially signed in 1993); see also Len Pasquarelli, Guidelines Lacking in CBA, ESPN
(Sept. 23, 2003), at http://sports.espn.go.comlnfl/columns/story?id=1621876 (assessing
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by NFLMA and NFL players in 1993).
124 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 385 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5,
2004) (highlighting NFLPA's and NFLMC's release of a side letter which illuminated
references to the Constitution and Bylaws in the CBA), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004);
see also Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 127 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004) (adding that
the NFL Commissioner sent copies of the revised constitution to all club owners,
presidents, and general managers along with a memorandum noting changes to the
eligibility rules). See generally Gardner, supra note 84, at 17 (explaining that eligibility
rules were discussed during negotiations yet do not appear in the CBA).
125 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 383 (discussing current NFL-NFLPA CBA); see
also Clarett, 369 F.3d at 127 (noting the entrance of the NFL Management Council, multi-
employer bargaining unit and NFLPA into the 1993 CBA). See generally Chris Ballard &
Lester Munson, Rush to Judgment; Suspended Ohio State Running Back Maurice Clarett
Says He May Sue the NFL to Gain Early Admission. Can His Lawyer Help Him Crack the
Pros?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 15, 2003, at 23 (emphasizing the absence of eligibility
rules in the 1993 NFL collective bargaining agreement's language).
126 See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NFL MGMT. COUNCIL
AND THE NFL PLAYERS ASS'N 2002-2008 (2002) (providing precise text), available at
http://www.nflpa.orglMembers/main.asp?subPage=CBA+Complete (last visited May 31,
2004); see also Clarett, 369 F.3d at 127 (specifying that clubs were prohibited from
selecting any college football player who had not first exhausted his college eligibility,
graduated from college or been out of high school for five football seasons and adding that
clubs were further barred from drafting a player who did not attend college or who had
attended college but did not play football, unless that person had been out of high school
for four football seasons). See generally Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (describing the
eligibility rule as generally prohibiting college underclassmen from participating in the
NFL draft).
127 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (describing "Special Eligibility" as an exception
to aforementioned eligibility rules).
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Such a player has been granted eligibility through special
permission of the Commissioner. In order to receive
consideration for the League's principal college draft in any
year, any application for special eligibility must be in the
Commissioner's office no later than January 6 of that year.
For college football players seeking eligibility, at least three
NFL seasons must have elapsed since the player was
graduated from high school.128
In 2003, the league promulgated new bylaws.129 In this
version, The Special Eligibility Rule is omitted in its entirety.130
A separate reference to the Commissioner's authority to interpret
the bylaws and league constitution to implement policy and
procedure appeared in the place of the Rule.131 Therefore, the
Rule exists as "policy and procedure" established by the
Commissioner. 132  Commissioner Tagliabue issued his
interpretation of the rule with respect to the 2004 draft:
SPECIAL ELIGIBILITY. Such player has been granted
eligibility through special permission of the Commissioner.
Any applications for special eligibility must be in the
Commissioner's office no later than Thursday, January 15,
2004, if the player is to be considered for inclusion in the
League's principal draft scheduled for April 24-25 2004.
Applications will be accepted only for college players for
whom at least three full college seasons have elapsed since
128 Id. at 385-86 (providing text of Bylaws section 12(1)(E)).
129 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 386 (noting that the NFLMC changed eligibility
rules by promulgating new bylaws in 2003); see also Clarett, 369 F.3d at 129 (highlighting
that little substantive change occurred post-2003 amendments, aside from the omission of
the Special Eligibility Rule). See generally Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Second
Circuit Review; Court Upholds The National Football League's Eligibility Rules, N.Y.L.J.,
June 23, 2004, at 3 (explaining the 2003 by-law amendments).
130 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 386 (emphasizing the complete omission of the
Special Eligibilty Rule); see also Clarett, 369 F.3d at 128 (describing the Special Eligibility
Rule's removal). See generally Flumenbaum & Karp, supra note 129, at 3 (commenting on
the Special Eligibility Rule omission).
131 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 386 (quoting the Commissioner's memorandum as
stating "the Commissioner shall interpret and from time to time establish policy and
procedure in respect to the provisions of the Constitution and Bylaws and any
enforcement thereof'); see also Clarett, 369 F.3d at 128 (noting issuance of Commissioner's
memorandum took place on Feb. 16, 1990). See generally Flumenbaum & Karp, supra
note 129, at 3 (highlighting Commissioner's retention of authorization to grant special
eligibility after 2003 amendments).
132 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 386 (adding that Commissioner's authority to enact
policy and procedure is documented in bylaws); Clarett, 369 F.3d at 128 (reiterating that
granting of special eligibility now falls under Commissioner's authority to enact "policy
and procedure"). See generally Flumenbaum & Karp, supra note 129, at 3 (describing
special eligibility grant after the 2003 amendments as a "practice" of the Commissioner).
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their high school graduation. Players will not be permitted to
elect to bypass the January 15 deadline in order to seek
eligibility for a later supplemental draft, and no
supplemental draft will be held to accommodate such an
election.13 3
D. Offensive Formation: Maurice Clarett
Maurice Clarett, Ohio State freshman star running back, led
his team to the NCAA national collegiate football championship
in 2002.134 Prior to his sophomore season, Ohio State and the
NCAA suspended Clarett pending investigation of numerous
violations of NCAA regulations. 135 Unable to play college football,
Clarett petitioned to be declared eligible for the 2004 NFL
collegiate draft.136 His petition was denied by the NFL under the
authority of the three-year draft eligibility rule.137 As a result,
Clarett brought suit against in NFL in the Southern District of
New York, alleging violations of § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
and § 2 of the Clayton Act.138 Clarett claimed that the teams
engaged in a group boycott of a broad class of players from the
NFL labor market and created an illegal restraint of trade.139
133 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 386 (providing the text of the Commissioner's
release).
134 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 387 (adding that Ohio State was undefeated in
2002); Associated Press, Buckeyes Upset Miami in Double-OT, Fiesta Bowl Thriller,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/college/2002bowls/news
/2003/01/03/fiesta.bowl ap (last visited Nov. 2, 2004) (noting that Maurice Clarett ran 5
yards for the winning touchdown in the 2002 Fiesta Bowl).
135 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (clarifying that Clarett was suspended by OSU
and the NCAA for the entire 2003-2004 season). See also Associated Press, Fitzgerald
Draft Status Could be Key, ESPN, at http://sports.espn.go.comlncf/news/story?id=1712813
(last visited Nov. 2, 2004) (explaining that Clarett was suspended before the 2003-2004
season because he accepted money from a family friend and lied about it to university and
NCAA investigators).
136 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (noting that Clarett petitioned the NFL after
being suspended for his sophomore year at Ohio State University); see also Lester
Munson, Rough Draft: In Taking on the Mighty NFL, Clarett Faces his Biggest Challenge
Yet, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 26, 2003, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2003/
writersllester_munsor09/26/holdingcourtindex.html (describing background to Clarett's
lawsuit).
137 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (discussing NFL player draft eligibility rules).
138 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (noting part of Clarett's motivation for
bringing suit is the potential he will not be able to play football elsewhere); Ballard &
Munson, supra note 125 (discussing the NCAA infractions that lead to Clarett's
suspension from playing football at Ohio State); Munson, supra note 136 (describing the
NCAA violations Clarett committed in order to be suspended for his sophomore season).
139 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 389 (asserting Clarett's allegations against the
NFL).
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Both Clarett and the NFL moved for summary judgment. 140 The
district court granted Clarett's motion, and ordered him eligible
for the 2004 NFL Draft.141 The NFL then requested a stay, but
the district court denied the motion.142
Following the NFL's appeal to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, a three-judge panel stayed the district court's order,
thereby preventing Clarett entrance to the 2004 draft.143 Clarett
immediately sent emergency appeals to the Supreme Court, and
both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Stevens refused to entertain
the appeal.144 Neither justice ruled on'the merits of the case. 145
Ginsburg stated that Clarett could still get to the NFL as the
league has expressed a willingness to promptly hold a
Supplemental Draft if Clarett prevailed in his lawsuit.146
However, the NFL Draft was held in April of 2004, and did not
include Clarett or other college players similarly seeking early
admittance.147 In order to be included in a Supplemental Draft,
140 See id. at 389 (describing both parties' motions for summary judgment).
141 See id. at 411 (ordering Clarett eligible for 2004 NFL Draft).
142 See id. (denying NFL petition for a stay of the district court's Feb. 5t' order
allowing Clarett entrance into the NFL draft); see also Lawyer: Clarett Will Be in Draft,
ESPN, Feb. 11, 2004, at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=1732768 (reporting
that the district court refused to stay its earlier decision).
143 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143 (reversing and remanding the District Court and
ordering them to enter judgment for the NFL, vacating the order declaring Clarett eligible
for the draft); see also Supplemental Draft Remains an Option, ESPN, Apr. 20, 2004, at
http://sports.espn.go.comlnfldraft/draftO4/news/storyid=1785560 (announcing Second
Circuit decision to stay the district court's summary judgment in favor of Clarett);
Supreme Court Turns Down Appeal by Clarett, ESPN, April 22, 2004 [hereinafter
Supreme Court Turns Down Appeal], at http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section=nfl
&id=1787668 (noting that the Supreme Court turned down Clarett's appeal from the
Second Circuit decision).
144 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3231 (2004) (denying
Clarett's application for an emergency appeal); see also Clarett Loses Pair of Emergency
Appeals, ESPN, Apr. 22, 2004 [hereinafter Clarett Loses Pair of Emergency Appeals], at
http://sports.espn.go.comlnfldraft/draftO4lnews/story?id=1787651 (noting that the
Supreme Court denied both of Clarett's appeals); Supreme Court Turns Down Appeal,
supra note 143 (discussing the denial of the appeal by the Supreme Court).
145 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3231 (2004) (denying
Clarett's application for an emergency appeal without discussing the merits); Clarett
Loses Pair of Emergency Appeals, supra note 144 (discussing the denial of both appeals
without reaching the merits of the issue); Supreme Court Turns Down Appeal, supra note
143 (stating the Supreme Court denied the appeals without deciding the ultimate issue).
146 See Clarett to Appeal Three-Judge Ruling Against Early Entry, ESPN, May 24,
2004 [hereinafter Clarett to Appeal Three-Judge Rulings], at http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/
news/story?id=1808438 (noting the disposition of the case upon reaching the Supreme
Court); Clarett Loses Pair of Emergency Appeals, supra note 144 (quoting Justice
Ginsburg); Supreme Court Turns Down Appeal, supra note 143 (discussing the Supreme
Court's reasoning in denying the appeal).
147 See Clarett Loses Pair of Emergency Appeals, supra note 144 (discussing the
denial of both appeals without reaching the merits of the issue); Clarett to Appeal Three-
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Clarett appealed the Second Circuit's decision to stay the district
court's order.148 The Second Circuit once again revisited the case
in May of 2004, and ruling on the merits, reversed and vacated
the district court's order.149 Clarett's attorneys publicly stated
they would continue to appeal the decision.150 Following the
rulings, the NFL Players Association stated a willingness to
include the draft eligibility rule in the next collective bargaining
agreement, due in 2007, to put an end to the controversy.151
In deciding in favor of Clarett, the district court held that two
affirmative defenses offered by the NFL failed as a matter of
law.152 First, the NFL argued that the three-year eligibility rule
was exempt from anti-trust scrutiny under the non-statutory
labor exemption, as the rule was a product of the collective
bargaining agreement between the league and the Players
Association.153 Second, the NFL claimed that the rule was a
reasonable restraint of trade.154 The district court held that the
Judge Ruling Against Early Entry, supra note 146 (noting the disposition of the case upon
reaching the Supreme Court rendered Clarett ineligible); Supreme Court Turns Down
Appeal, supra note 143 (stating the Supreme Court denied the appeals without deciding
the ultimate issue, leaving the Second Circuit decision in place).
148 See Clarett Continues Court Fight to Play in Pros, ESPN, May 26, 2004, at
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1810093 (noting Clarett's decision to appeal to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals); see also Randy Covitz, Courts Likely Won't Help
Clarett, KAN. CITY STAR, May 2, 2004 (analyzing Clarett's Second Circuit appeal and its
likelihood of success), available at http://www.kansascity.comlmldfkansascity/sports/
8569525.htm?lc. See generally Clarett to File Challenge to NFL Ruling, ABC NEWS, May
24, 2004, at http://www.wjla.com/news/stories/0504/148979.html (reviewing the history
and possible future implications of Clarett's case).
149 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143 (sustaining prior ruling that barred Clarett from the
NFL).
150 See Clarett to Appeal Three-Judge Ruling, supra note 146 (quoting Clarett
attorneys as promising to continue the appeals process).
151 See Upshaw: It Will Be In Writing, ESPN, May 27, 2004, at http://sports.espn.go.
comlnfllnews/story?id=1810603 (quoting the NFLPA as promising to include the three-
year draft eligibility rule in the next contract, due in 2007); see also Mark Maske &
Leonard Shapiro, Draft Rule Will Be Made Much Clearer, WASH. POST, May 27, 2004
(describing the willingness of both the NFL and NFLPA to have the draft eligibility rule
expressly specified in the next agreement), available at http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58782-2004May26.html. See generally Shauna Itri, Note,
Maurice Clarett v. National Football League, Inc.: An Analysis of Clarett's Challenge to
the Legality of the NFL's Draft Eligibility Rule Under Antitrust Law, 11 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L. FORuM 303, 330-31 (2004) (analyzing the current collective bargaining agreement
and its effect on players such as Clarett).
152 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11 (holding that the NFL could not preclude
Clarett from entering the 2004 NFL draft).
153 See id. at 393 (quoting the NFL's lawyers as arguing that "if the draft itself is
protected by the non-statutory labor exemption, it follows a fortiori that rules governing
eligibility for the draft ... are also protected by the exemption").
154 See id. at 407 (rejecting the NFL's argument that Clarett had not established the
contours of the relevant market).
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rule was not exempt under the non-statutory labor exemption
because it: (1) was not a mandatory subject of bargaining; (2)
governs only non-employees; and (3) did not result from arm's
length negotiations.155 The court was not satisfied that the rule
enhanced competition.156 Applying the "quick look" approach,157
the court concluded that the rule was an unreasonable restraint
of trade by virtue of its effect as a complete bar against Clarett's
entry into the market of professional football players. 158 The
court went so far as to say that "Clarett has alleged the very type
of injury... that the antitrust laws are designed to prevent."159
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Monday Morning Quarterback: Clarett v. NFL Decided
Correctly
The district court reached the correct result when it ruled in
favor of Maurice Clarett's motion for summary judgment. 160
However, this article will argue that the decision was premised
on a hodgepodge of antitrust standards that are inherently
flawed. The standards frequently contradict one another when
taken into consideration concurrently.161 The fault lies not with
the district court, but rather with sixty years of antitrust
jurisprudence that has granted an ever-increasing amount of
discretion to the courts. Increased discretion allowed the
judiciary the opportunity to promulgate "yardsticks" based on
purely subjective policy decisions. First, I will examine the
Supreme Court's unsound decision in Brown v. Pro Football,
155 See id. at 382 (rejecting the NFL's non-statutory labor exemption arguments).
156 See id. (stating that Clarett's alleged injury was, in actuality, "a complete bar to
entry into the market for his services").
157 See id. at 407-08 (explaining that "a 'quick look' analysis, as the Supreme Court
has recently explained, is appropriate where 'the great likelihood of anticompetitive
effects can easily be ascertained,' and 'an observer with even a rudimentary
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have
an anticompetitive effect"') (quoting Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)).
158 See id. at 409 (deciding that "[b]ecause the League has failed to offer any
legitimate procompetitive [sic] justifications for the Rule, Clarett must prevail").
159 See id. at 382 (quoting Learned Hand as stating the antitrust laws will not endure
a contract "which unreasonably forbids anyone to practice their calling').
160 See id. at 410 (holding that "Clarett's motion for summary judgment is granted
and the NFL's motions are denied").
161 See discussion infra Parts B-C.
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Inc.,162 which significantly broadened the scope of the non-
statutory labor exemption by extending it to include multi-
employer bargaining units like the NFL.163 Second, I will discuss
the five contradictory approaches adopted by the Supreme Court
when it examined the "reasonableness" of a restraint on trade in
antitrust cases. 164 Lower courts have either (1) unsuccessfully
attempted to reconcile the contradictory methods, or (2) created a
useless m6lange of the approaches in an attempt to justify the
subjective policy choice they have made in a particular case. In
either instance, the result is inadequate under the doctrine of
stare decisis. Finally, I will propose a more workable standard
that will simplify the "reasonableness" analysis.
B. Intentional Grounding: Brown v. Pro Football Inc.
In Clarett, the district court held that the NFL's affirmative
defense asserting the three-year draft rule was immune from
antitrust scrutiny failed as a matter of law.165 The NFL argued
that the authority by which it could even claim the non-statutory
labor exemption is found in a series of cases culminating in the
1996 Supreme Court decision Brown v. Pro Football Inc. 166 The
majority in Brown held that the NFL was immune from antitrust
162 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
163 See id. at 234 (applying non-statutory labor exemption to NFL); see also Nat'l
Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding in circuit court that
antitrust laws were inapplicable to collective bargaining situation between basketball
teams and players as result of exemption), cert. denied, Williams v. Nat'l Basketball
Ass'n, 518 U.S. 1016 (1996); Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir.
1989) (announcing in circuit court that antitrust laws are inapplicable to restraints in
collective bargaining agreement involving pro football teams and players because
exemption extends beyond stage of impasse between two sides), cert. denied, Powell v.
Nat'l Football League, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
164 See discussion infra Part F.
165 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 397 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5,
2004) (deciding that NFL's summary judgment motion could not be granted based on
exemption because Clarett demonstrated NFL's lack of proof on issue of arm's-length
bargaining).
166 See id. at 393 (discussing history of Brown upon which NFL relies); see also
Brown, 518 U.S. at 234 (concluding exemption applicable in suit between football teams
and union); Nat'l Basketball Assoc., 45 F.3d at 693 (concluding antitrust laws inapplicable
to collective bargaining situation between teams and players); Powell, 930 F.2d at 1304
(holding that exemption applies beyond impasse); Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 956-57 (2d
Cir. 1987) (stating that college draft and prohibition of player corporations are exempt
from Sherman Act). But see Smith v. Pro Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 741-42 (D.D.C. 1976)
(deciding that exemption did not bar plaintiff recovery even though player draft was
mandatory subject of bargaining between two parties). See generally McCourt v. Cal.
Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1979) (declaring whether exemption applies is
governed by developed and applicable standards of labor law).
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liability when it unilaterally imposed a wage scale on a class of
players after the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement, and negotiations for a new agreement had reached an
impasse. 167 The imposition of a salary cap on the particular class
of players was challenged as anticompetitive, and but for the
existence of the non-statutory labor exemption, would most likely
be deemed an illegal restraint of trade.168 The Court's analysis
began with an affirmation of the non-statutory labor exemption
as articulated in the Jewel Tea-Pennington- Connell
triumvirate.169 However, the similarity between the prior cases
and the Court's analysis in Brown ended there. The majority
defined the collective bargaining process as "ongoing' and
encompassed the time period both before and after the
finalization of the actual agreement.170 Prior to Brown, the Court
had never extended the non-statutory labor exemption beyond
the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement and
negotiation impasse. 171  Furthermore, Brown was the first
application of the exemption to a multi-employer unit like the
NFL.172 Prior cases had each afforded the exemption to only
167 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250 (holding that conduct at issue directly related to
lawful operation of collective bargaining process).
168 See id. (discussing how issue arose from and was directly related to subject of
mandatory bargaining and that sports is not distinct from other areas of multiemployer
collective bargaining).
169 See id. at 235-36 (stating "[t]he immunity before us rests upon what this Court
has called the 'nonstatutory' [sic] labor exemption from the antitrust laws"); see also
Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 636
(1975) (concluding agreement between union and general contractor was not exempt from
antitrust laws because of direct restraints on competition resulting from wage and
working condition differences); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676, 689-90 (1965) (deciding marketing-hours restriction and distinct prices were directly
related to wages, hours, and working conditions, thus exempting union's attempt to
obtain such provisions through arm's-length negotiations from the Sherman Act); United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965) (holding agreement between labor
union and employer to obtain industry wide uniform labor standards did not fall under
exemption).
170 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 236 (discussing nature of collective bargaining at issue).
171 See Connell, 381 U.S. at 636 (determining exemption inapplicable to wage and
working conditions within existing agreement); Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90 (holding
that exemption applied to wage provisions within existing collective bargaining
agreement); Pennington, 381 U.S. at 669 (deciding on uniform industry labor standards
discussed in current bargaining agreement).
172 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 240 (proceeding on assumption that labor law treats
multiemployer bargaining units no differently than single employer units); see also Dylan
M. Carson, Note, The Browning of Sports Law: Defining the Survival of the Labor
Exemption After Expiration of Bargaining Agreements, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1141, 1176
(1997) (stating the Court took exemption to its scope by applying it to multi-employer
bargaining situation). See generally Glenn Merten, Recent Decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1332, 1339
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single-unit employers.173  Finally, the Court rejected the
argument that the exemption should not be applicable to
professional sports because of its unique bargaining process. 174
The Court specifically stated that it could not "find a satisfactory
basis for distinguishing football players from other organized
workers" in terms of collective bargaining. 175
In reaching its determination, the Court discussed its rationale
for not "interfering" with the collective bargaining process. 176 The
Court posited that judicial antitrust scrutiny of the bargaining
process would afford courts the dangerous power to substitute
their own discretion for congressional labor policy. 177 It feared
that such a result would become a "web of detailed rules spun by
many different non-expert antitrust judges and juries, not a set
of labor rules enforced by a single expert administrative body,
namely the Labor Board."178 Ironically, the very mechanism by
which the Court attempted to effectuate this restriction of
judicial discretion was by significantly broadening the scope of a
judicially created exemption, from what is otherwise a clearly
articulated statutory mandate.179 The exemption, by its very
(1996) (commenting that exemption was necessary for multi-employer units in labor
situations).
173 See H.A. Artists & Assoc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 723 (1981)
(deeming that exemption applied to independent theatrical agents who placed actors and
actresses into positions of employment); Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90 (noting that single
employer at issue was entitled to exemption). See also Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Williams,
45 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying exemption to multi-employer unit at circuit
court level).
174 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 248 (commenting that football players are no different
from any other type of organized employees even though teams are somewhat dependent
on each other for economic survival, players have individual skills and players often
negotiate their own contracts).
175 See id. at 249 (refuting dissent's points on "unique features" of collective
bargaining relationship).
176 See id. at 250 (noting that conduct involved took place immediately after
negotiation period, was mandatory and directly related to negotiations, and concerned
only parties to collective bargaining relationship).
177 See id. at 250 (explaining that intent of Congress was to have Board answer
multiemployer bargaining questions).
178 Id. at 231(reasoning that implicit exemption was applicable).
179 See id. at 250 (expanding exemption by applying it to multi-employer bargaining
units and by declining to define its extreme outer boundaries); see also Jeffrey L. Kessler
& David G. Feher, What Justice Breyer Could Not Know At His Mother's Knee: The
Adverse Effects of Brown v. Pro Football On Labor Relations In Professional Sports, 14
ANTITRUST ABA 41 (2000) (commenting how Justice Breyer's interpretation of exemption
was "extremely broad view"); Brian T. Coolidge, Note, Form Over Function: The Goals of
Labor and Antitrust Laws Sacrificed Upon a Collective Bargaining Impasse, Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 2116, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 841, 859 (1997) (stating that Supreme
Court's decision effectively prevents antitrust laws from operating as Congress intended
by granting more power to employers in negotiating process).
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nature, calls upon the courts to interject subjective weight to
competing federal antitrust and labor policies. 80 Congress
enacted a specific statutory labor exemption from antitrust
law.1 1 By creating an ever-broadening judicial role in the
application of antitrust restrictions to particular sets of facts, the
Court is not deferring to congressional intent, but thwarting it.
Moreover, the Brown Court explicitly refused to delineate the
"outer boundaries" of the non-statutory labor exemption, thereby
providing no guidance as to the furthest reaches of the exemption
to the lower courts. 182
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the application of
the non-statutory labor exemption to the facts of Brown was
inappropriate.1 8 3 First, he asserted that the majority failed to
give proper weight to the fundamental difference between
professional sports and other labor-related situations.1S4
Specifically, Justice Stevens noted that professional football is a
unique industry in which employers, not employees, strive for a
non-competitive uniform salary, and would thereby seek the
180 See Steven D. Bucholz, Comment, Run, Kick, and (Im)passe: Expanding
Employers' Ability to Unilaterally Impose Conditions of Employment After Impasse in
Brown v. Pro Football, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1224 (1997) (indicating that balancing test
is involved between labor and antitrust laws and policy concerns); Carson, supra note 172,
at 1156-58 (noting that exemption is required in certain bargaining relationships to
account for conflicting congressional antitrust policies); Jonathan P. Heyl, Note, Brown v.
Pro Football, Inc.: Pulling a Tarp of Antitrust Immunity Over the Entire Playing Field and
Leaving the Game, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1030, 1049-54 (1997) (pointing out policy differences
between labor and antitrust law requires weighing of exemption's impact upon both areas
of law to see whether or not sufficient protection exists).
181 See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2004) (supplementing Sherman Act by stating:
"[Tihe labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of
labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual
help .. "); see also Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2004) (narrowing situations
where injunctions can be granted in labor disputes, thus necessitating reading of both
Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act to determine if trade union conduct constituted
Sherman Act violation); Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 229-30 (reviewing history of statutory
exemption).
182 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250 (1996) (declining to determine how far exemption
extends); see also Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 131 (2d Cir. 2004)
(finding that most guidance as to boundaries of exemption derives mostly from cases
where agreements between employer and union allegedly extinguished competitor in
marketplace at issue); Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 963 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that limits
of exemption do not need to be determined based on issue at hand).
183 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 254-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that neither
policies underlying relevant statutes at issue nor narrower focus on exemption's purpose
justify exemption here).
184 See id. at 252 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that ability of players to negotiate
individual contracts separates league from other organized labor because employers are
attempting to set uniform standards rather than employees).
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protection of the exemption. 185 Professional football employers, in
particular, impose restrictions on movement of players within the
monopolistic industry. 186 Next, he highlighted that the
imposition of the salary cap was a unilateral action by the NFL,
and did nothing to "facilitate the collective bargaining
process."187 In essence, a deed that was decidedly adverse to the
settled labor policy of free bargaining did not deserve to be
afforded the protection of an exemption that was purported to
protect labor policy objectives.1S8 Particularly persuasive on this
point was the league admission that the imposition of the wage
cap was "to save money" by affecting the labor market directly. 189
Finally, Justice Stevens noted that the majority contradicted
well-established precedent for not extending the non-statutory
labor exemption, and that the decision "dangerously" broadened
what was intended to be a narrow judicially-crafted exemption to
185 See id. at 256 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasizing there is something special
about professional sports that should affect the framework of labor negotiations).
186 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that employers seek to impose wage
restraints by unilaterally forbidding players from individually competing in the labor
market).
187 See id. at 257 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the extent of the bargaining
involved "amounted to nothing more than the employers' notice to the union that they had
decided to implement a decision to replace individual salary negotiations with a uniform
wage level for a specific group of players").
188 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (claiming employers should not be entitled to a
judicially crafted exemption from antitrust liability, which "has its source in the strong
labor policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and
working conditions" when there is "no similarly strong labor policy that favors the
association of employers to eliminate a competitive method of negotiating wages that
predates collective bargaining and that labor would prefer to preserve"); see also Pamela
Clark, supra note 20, at 580 (highlighting Justice Stevens' explanation that "the origin of
the nonstatutory [sic] exemption is in the 'strong labor policy favoring the association of
employees to eliminate competition over wages and working conditions"' and that "no
policy favors the association of employers for the purpose of eliminating a competitive
method of negotiating wages before collective bargaining takes place"); Michael G.
Langan, Comment, Why a Fixed Salary for Development Squad Players Does Not Hurt the
Game: Defending the Decision Not to Argue Consumer Injury in Brown v. Pro Football, 5
GEO. MASON L. REV. 559, 575 (1997) (noting that Justice Stevens "concluded that the
Court was expanding, for employers' benefit, a limited exemption that the Court had
created to benefit only labor").
189 See Brief for Petitioners at 8, Brown v. Pro Football, 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (No. 95-
388) (arguing "[tihe primary purpose of the fixed-salary concept was 'to save [the clubs]
money,' as respondents 'frankly admitted"'); Chris L. Dickerson, Note, Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., - The Nonstatutory Exemption from Antitrust Liability Becomes a
Management Weapon, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 1047, 1060 (1997) (stating "[t]he NFL admitted
that the primary purpose of fixing the developmental squad players salaries was 'to save
money"'). See generally Brown, 518 U.S. at 254-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
what is at stake in this litigation is exempting from antitrust scrutiny collective action
initiated by employers to depress wages below the level that would be produced in a free
market).
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federal antitrust law.190 Recalling Jewel Tea and Pennington,
Justice Stevens argued that simply because an antitrust action
"touches on an area of labor law contained in collective
bargaining," it does not automatically implicate the
exemption.191 While the majority contended that the NFL's
action in Brown "grew out of, and was directly related to, the
lawful operation of the bargaining process,"192 Justice Stevens
argued that the standard of Pennington required much more
than such a cursory link.193 Specifically, Pennington directed the
court to make a "detailed examination into whether the policies
of labor law so strongly supported the agreement struck by the
bargaining parties that it should be immune from antitrust
scrutiny."194 The failure of the majority to undertake this
analysis, Justice Stevens concluded, resulted in the
"unprecedented expansion" of the non-statutory labor
exemption. 195
C. Fumble: The Impact of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption's
Expanded Scope
The practical adverse effects of expanding the scope of the non-
statutory labor exemption to professional football were seen
190 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[a]lthough
exemptions should be construed narrowly.., the Court provides a sweeping justification
for the exemption that it creates today. The consequence is a newly minted exemption
that ... the Court crafts only by ignoring the reasoning of one of our prior decisions").
191 See id. at 259 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority concludes that
"almost any concerted action by employers that touches on a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining, no matter how obviously offensive to the policies underlying the
Nation's antitrust statutes, should be immune from scrutiny so long as a collective-
bargaining process is in place"); see also Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676, 700 (1965) (noting that although Pennington involved mandatory subjects of
bargaining, the workers' activity was held subject to an antitrust action by two lower
courts); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 657 (1965) (holding that an
agreement among large companies to eliminate small coal mining companies to decrease
overproduction of coal and raise wages violated antitrust law).
192 Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
193 See id. at 260 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's argument that
"the exemption applies because the employers' action 'grew out of, and was directly
related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process,' . . . 'was said and rejected in
Pennington").
194 Id. at 260 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195 See id. at 260 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding "the Court's analysis...
constitute[s] both an unprecedented expansion of a heretofore limited exemption, and an
unexplained repudiation of the reasoning in a prior, nonconstitutional [sic] decision that
Congress itself has not seen fit to override").
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immediately. 196 The NFL, able to enjoy an overbroad antitrust
immunity, was able to impose unilateral decisions without union
consent or fear of suit.197 As a result, lockouts, strikes and de-
certification of the Players Association were threatened. 198 Even
prior to Brown expanding the exemption, de-certification of the
union occurred throughout the early 1990s so that players were
free to bring antitrust suit. 199 In essence, players were forced to
abandon the protection and benefits of unionized activities in
order to bring antitrust actions. 200 This result does not serve to
further any federal labor policy.
196 See generally Pamela Clark, supra note 20, at 590 (arguing that the effects of the
restraint were felt by parties other than the developmental squad players and the league,
including the entire roster, the market and fans); Covelli, supra note 25, at 289 (noting
that collective-bargaining is inhibited by an overbroad extension of the non-statutory
labor exemption); Michael C. Harper, Multiemployer Bargaining, Antitrust Law, and
Team Sports: The Contingent Choice of a Broad Exemption, 38 WM & MARY L. REV. 1663,
1720 (1997) (stating that the Brown holding will result in more strikes and lockouts).
197 See generally Covelli, supra note 25, at 290 (arguing that shielding management
from anti-trust attack will lead to unilateral imposition of anti-competitive player
restraints, labor strife and union decertification); Dickerson, supra note 189, at 1072
(noting that "the Court's decision ... potentially allows employers to unilaterally impose
any bargaining term they wish as long as labor contract negotiations are ongoing"); Heyl,
supra note 180, at 1066-67 (stating that the decision allows employers to implement new
or different terms after impasse and engage in hard bargaining without fear of antitrust
sanctions).
198 See Daniel H. Weintraub, Survey, 1994-95 Annual Survey of Labor and
Employment Law: Labor Law: Collective Bargaining, 37 B.C. L. REV. 303, 314 (1996)
(explaining that employees will either have to forgo unionization or decertify their union
in order to utilize antitrust remedies when bargaining with multiemployer bargaining
units). See generally Alan M. Levine, Note, Hard Cap or Soft Cap: The Original Player
Mobility Restrictions for the Professional Sports Leagues, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 243 (1995) (outlining the way in which employers and unions relate in
lieu of the ability of the NFL to make unilateral decisions); Tyras, supra note 74, at 297
(describing the nature of employer-union relations).
199 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 198, at 187 (stating that, until its decertification in
the early 1990s, the NFLPA negotiated on behalf of the players for issues such as salaries,
grievance policies and free agency); Dan Messeloff, Note, The NBA's Deal with the Devil:
The Antitrust Implications of the 1999 NBA-NBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, 10
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 521, 547 (2000) (explaining how the players'
only alternative to challenge an existing trade restraint is to decertify their union); Tyras,
supra note 74, at 326 (discussing the 1989 decision of the NFLPA to renounce its position
as collective bargaining agent for the NFL players, thereby allowing several players to
recover for the league's violation of antitrust laws).
200 See Brown v. Pro Football, 50 F.3d 1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (asserting that if
employees wish to seek the protections of the Sherman Act, they must forgo unionization
or decertify their unions); see also Eric D. Scheible, Note, No Runs. No Hits. One Error:
Eliminating Major League Baseball's Antitrust Exemption Will Not Save the Game, 73 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 73, 99 (1995) (stating the court implies, in dicta, that if unions want
to protect themselves with antitrust laws, such as the Sherman Act, they must either
forgo unionization or decertify an existing union); Weintraub, supra note 198, at 314
(explaining that, by extending the non-statutory exemption beyond impasse to the point
where the NFL can unilaterally alter the terms, management retains all the advantages
of antitrust immunity without giving the employees any parallel benefit).
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The practical legal effect of the non-statutory labor exemption's
expanded scope also lends weight to the argument that the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown was unsound. 201 Brown
expressed concerns that by not applying the exemption to the
facts, "un-expert" courts would have wide discretion to determine
the applicability of antitrust laws and establish "detailed rules"
that would act to frustrate congressional labor policy.202 Not only
did the circuits articulate multi-factored tests to control the
application of the non-statutory labor exemption, the tests
themselves varied from circuit to circuit. 203 As discussed in Part
I, both the Sixth and Eighth Circuits adopted a three step
analysis examining the parties, subject and nature of the
bargaining in a particular instance.204 The Second Circuit
acknowledged the existence of the Eighth Circuit test, but
declined to adopt it.205 Instead, reaching back to the Supreme
201 See Coolidge, supra note 179, at 842 (asserting that the irony of Brown is that
extending the non-statutory exemption actually thwarts the NLRA's goal of maintaining a
level playing field); Scheible, supra note 200, at 101 (stating that the Brown court used
folly instead as wisdom in suggesting that decertification was a viable alternative to the
collective bargaining process); Weintraub, supra note 198, at 313 (purporting that despite
the fact that the Brown court sought to maintain a level field in employer-employee
relations, its decision instead contradicts the congressional mandate of favoring the
collective bargaining process as the primary means of resolution in labor disputes).
202 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 242 (explaining the difficulty in allowing courts to make
evaluations regarding employer-employee relations, in that such practice results in a
myriad of detailed rules set forth by many different non-expert judges and juries, instead
of an established set of rules implemented by one expert administrative body).
203 See Kieran M. Corcoran, When Does the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory Labor
Exemption in Professional Sports, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1045, 1052 (1994) (proposing that
courts have applied the exemption inconsistently by making determinations with no
defined congressional guidance); Ethan Lock, Powell v. National Football League: The
Eighth Circuit Sacks The National Football League Players Association, 67 DENY. U.L.
REV. 135, 140 (1990) (stating that the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption is not
clearly defined, as there is no general standard for applying the exemption to employer-
union agreements); Tyras, supra note 74, at 340 (purporting that neither federal trial nor
appellate courts who have addressed the exemption issue have offered a definitive
solution).
204 See Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (1976) (outlining the three
step analysis); see also McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1997 (6th Cir. 1979)
(relying on the principles stated by the Mackey court to determine whether the non-
statutory labor exemption applies to a given provision of a collective bargaining
agreement); Shawn Treadwell, Note, An Examination of the Nonstatutory Labor
Exemption From the Antitrust Laws, In the Context of Professional Sports, 23 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 955, 964 (1996) (demonstrating the Eighth Circuit's utilization of the three
prong test to determine whether exemption from antitrust scrutiny applies to an
agreement).
205 See Local 210 Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Labor Relations Div. Associated
Gen. Contractors of Am., 844 F.2d 69, 79 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Jewel Tea, the court
acknowledges that the test to determine whether an agreement is protected by the non-
statutory exemption considers "not the form of the agreement... but its relative impact
on the product market and the interests of union members").
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Court's analysis in Jewel Tea, the Second Circuit opted for the
simpler balancing test.206 However, balancing the competing
antitrust and labor policies implies that the courts must insert a
subjective determination of the importance of particular
principles over others. 207 Not only does this controvert the
concern of the Supreme Court as to the latitude of discretion
appropriately exerted by the judiciary in these instances, it also
makes the determination itself primarily fact-based. 208 As such,
it is difficult to reconcile an analytical approach that necessitates
dependence on small fact discrepancies with the broad and far-
reaching congressional mandate stated in the Sherman Act.209
The district court in Clarett demonstrated how this approach to
the non-statutory labor exemption is at its core an impermissibly
discretionary and fact-dependent determination. 210
In holding that the NFL's three-year draft eligibility rule was
not subject to the non-statutory labor exemption, the district
court in Clarett first made three determinations. 211 First, the
rule did not address the mandatory subject of bargaining. 212
206 See id. at 80 (holding the appropriate test is "one that balances the conflicting
policies embodied in the labor and antitrust laws, with the policies inherent in labor law
serving as the first point of reference").
207 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 242 (stating that antitrust laws allow judges and juries to
base liability upon little more than uniform behavior among competitors). See generally
Lock, supra note 203, at 142 (discussing the consequence of judicial review of labor
relations); Abstract, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 159 (1998) (questioning the role of the
judiciary in employer relations).
208 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 242 (holding that subjecting the practice at issue to
antitrust law is to require antitrust courts to answer important questions regarding
collective bargaining which is the very result labor exemption seeks to avoid); see also
Lock, supra note 203, at 142 (stating that Congress clearly intended to limit judicial
involvement in labor disputes when it enacted the federal labor statutes). See generally
Abstract, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 159 (1998) (questioning the role of the judiciary
in employer relations).
209 See Sherman Act at § 1 (declaring the Sherman Act's broad applicability
encompassing "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States"); see also Daralyn
J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, The Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions for Anticompetitive
Litigation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 757, 772 (1992) (discussing broad applicability of the Sherman
Act). But see Local 210, 844 F.2d at 79 (declaring "the test is one that balances the
conflicting policies embodied in the labor and antitrust laws, with the policies inherent in
labor law serving as the first point of reference").
210 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 405 n.164 (defining the limits of the non-statutory
exemption and then using courts discretion in the balancing test). See generally Local 210,
844 F.2d at 79 (discussing the balancing test); Durie & Lemley, supra note 209, at 772
(applying the Sherman Act).
211 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (stating that "policies inherent in labor law
serv[e]as the first point of reference").
212 See id. at 393 (noting that the NFL's rule does not discuss wages or hours). See
also NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 684 (2d Cir. 1995) (involving a dispute between league
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Second, Maurice Clarett was a stranger to the bargaining
agreement.213 Third, the rule itself did not arise from bona fide
arms-length negotiations. 214
The district court first found that the rule made no particular
mention of wages, hours, or conditions of employment, the
generally accepted mandatory subjects of bargaining. 215 In order
to arrive at this determination the district court first had to
distinguish two recent Second Circuit cases involving
professional sports employment, and the draft in particular. 216
This forced the district court to draw a very narrow difference
between employment eligibility and employment restrictions that
would apply to potential employees.217 In Wood v. National
Basketball Association,218 Wood, a college basketball player and
first-round draft choice, challenged an agreement between the
NBA and the players' union that restricted draftees from
negotiating salary with any other teams. 219 The Second Circuit
barred Wood's action by applying the non-statutory labor
exemption. 220 The district court in Clarett stated the controlling
reason for applying the exemption was the fact that Wood was
drafted first and then challenged the draft practices. 221 In
National Basketball Association v. Williams,222 players sought
removal of provisions limiting salary and employment
negotiation with multiple teams following the draft, as part of a
new collective bargaining agreement with the league. 223 After an
players and a salary cap); Wood, 809 F.2d at 956 (holding that basketball player's claims
raised no antitrust concerns because they were subjects of collective bargaining).
213 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (declaring "[t]he labor laws cannot be used to
shield anticompetitive agreements between employers and unions that affect only those
outside of the bargaining unit").
214 See id. at 396 (holding the NFL is not entitled to summary judgment for failure to
show arms length negotiations).
215 See id. at 393 (requiring discussion of these factors for a rule to address
mandatory subject of bargaining).
216 See id. at 394 (distinguishing Williams and Wood).
217 See id. at 395 (stating that the rule's terms apply to those not yet employed by the
NFL).
218 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
219 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94 (discussing Wood); See also Wood, 809 F.2d
at 956 (introducing the plaintiffs arguments).
220 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94 (discussing the courts holding in Wood).
221 See id. (distinguishing the plaintiff in Wood as being already employed).
222 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
223 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 390-91 (explaining the NFL is not regulated by
antitrust laws in order to promote collective bargaining between employers and unions
612
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impasse in the negotiation, the league successfully won a
declaratory judgment that the agreement, including these
provisions, was not subject to antitrust scrutiny under the non-
statutory labor exemption. 224  The Clarett district court
explained:
Following Wood, the [Second Circuit] held that each of the
disputed terms governed players who are or would be
employed by the league, and addressed the players' rights to
negotiate over the team they will play for and the salary they
will earn. These topics, by definition, concern the terns and
conditions of employment that attach once a player is
drafted.225
Distinguishing these two cases from Clarett, the district court
stated that neither Wood nor Williams involved "job
eligibility,"226 reasoning that mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining only apply to current employees or potential
employees. 227 Conversely, the three-year draft rule had the effect
of "mak[ing] a class of potential players unemployable" and "thus
affects wages only in the sense that a player subject to the rule
will earn none."228 While the result is fair, and the distinction
between potential and eligible employees plausible, this is the
same type of microanalysis that the Supreme Court attempted
and failed to prevent in Brown.229  Another court could
presumably determine that "eligibility" of potential employees
came within the gamut of the overall "draft" process of
employment, affecting wages in the most extreme way - by
over wages, hours, and working conditions). See also Williams, 45 F.3d at 687 (arguing
salary caps suppress salaries and prevent competition among basketball teams).
224 See Williams, 45 F.3d at 688 (holding antitrust laws do not prohibit labor unions
from bargaining with employers over terms and conditions of employment).
225 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 394 (emphasis added).
226 See id. at 395 (stating the non-statutory labor exemption does not cover wages,
hours, or conditions of employment and subsequently does not govern un-drafted players).
227 See id. (declaring collective bargaining unquestionably applies to current and
prospective employees).
228 See id. at 393-95 (arguing a class of potential players are unemployable because
the Rule requires three college seasons to pass before player is eligible for the draft).
229 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250 (holding unilateral contract implementation is subject
to non-statutory antitrust exemption because the conduct took place immediately after
negotiations, was related to the bargaining process and involved an issue that needed to
be negotiated); see also Bryant, supra note 15, at 87 (noting the Brown holding that
owners could impose unilateral restrictions on players); Note, Releasing Superstars from
Peonage: Union Consent & the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REV. 874, 877
(1991) (discussing statutory labor exemptions in antitrust law).
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negating them altogether. However, this would lead such a court
to a different result than the district court in Clarett.
The district court found that Clarett was a stranger to the
bargaining agreement, and therefore the exemption would not
apply.230 However, the court once again distinguished "potential"
employees from "ineligible" employees by stating:
There is no dispute that collective bargaining agreements,
and therefore the non-statutory labor exemption, apply to
both prospective and current employees. Newcomers to an
industry may not object to provisions of collective bargaining
agreements that speak to wages, hours, or conditions of
employment on the grounds that they were not present for
the bargaining sessions ... Clarett's situation is very
different. He is not permitted to be drafted - allegedly
because the NFL and the union agreed to exclude players in
his class. But Clarett's eligibility was not the union's to trade
away. Indeed, the Rule does not deal with the rights of any
NFL players or draftees. That the non-statutory labor
exemption does not apply in such a case is simply the flip side
of the rule that the exemption only applies to mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining, those governing wages,
hours, and working conditions.231
This analysis once again relies on the subjective judgment that
found the distinguishable characteristic between potential and
eligible employees discussed earlier. 232 In addition, the rationale
provided by the last sentence for this second determination begs
the question, i.e., that the non-statutory labor exemption does
not apply, because the court determined that the exemption did
not apply earlier in its analysis on a different subject. Therefore,
the analysis of this second factor does not provide any
supplementary support for the decision because it is wholly
premised on the same rationale previously articulated.
Finally, the district court found that the non-statutory labor
exemption did not apply because the three-year rule was not the
230 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (explaining labor laws cannot be used to
protect those who are not a party to the bargaining relationship).
231 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (second emphasis added).
232 See id. (distinguishing potential from eligible employees); see also Williams, 45
F.3d at 686 (stating NBA has right to negotiate with eligible players in the college draft);
Mirabito, supra note 18, at 845 (noting only certain players can challenge the draft on
antitrust violations).
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result of bona fide arm's length negotiation.233 The court noted
that the historical record of the rule was particularly meager,
and stated that "what the record omits speaks louder than what
it contains."234 The first version of the three-year draft rule arose
prior to the first collective bargaining agreement entered into
between the league and a players association. 235 Furthermore,
the CBA at issue never mentioned the rule itself.236 However, it
contained a provision "waiv[ing] the right to bargain over any
provision of the Constitution and Bylaws ... [and] to resolve any
dispute ... involving interpretation or application of the
Constitution and Bylaws in accordance with the dispute
resolution procedures of the CBA."237 The Bylaws referenced by
this provision did, in fact, contain a provision of the three-year
rule.238 The district court drew the distinction between actual
bargaining over the rule and the waiver to challenge it, stating
that while the Bylaws containing the rule demonstrate "that the
union agreed not to bargain over or challenge the rule, they in no
way demonstrate that the rule itself arose from, or as agreed to
during, the process of collective bargaining."239 Once again, this
factual anomaly required the court to make a subjective
determination: that the bargain not to bargain over a specific
provision constituted a lack of "bargaining" sufficient to bring the
rule within the scope of the non-statutory exemption.240 This
233 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395-96 (stating three-year rule could only be
subject to the non-statutory labor exemption if it was negotiated at arm's length).
234 See id. (explaining rule was not the result of collective bargaining).
235 See id. (stating rule was adopted prior to NFLPA becoming a part of collective
bargaining process); see also Itri, supra note 151, at 312 (noting three-year draft rule is
now a part of collective bargaining agreement); Pasquarelli, supra note 123 (stating the
three-year draft rule does not mention collective bargaining).
236 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (stating union agreed not to challenge rule);
Itri, supra note 151, at 312 (stating collective bargaining is never mentioned in the
drafting rule); Pasquarelli, supra note 123 (stating the three-year drafting rule never
mentions collective bargaining).
237 Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 396.
238 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (noting that when the CBA became effective a
side letter was executed acknowledging that the bylaws were referenced in the CBA).
239 Id. at 396.
240 See id. (looking to the history of the Rule, and to the notion that the parties
agreed not to bargain over the rule itself, and concluding that this was not sufficient to
satisfy this element of the exemption requirements). See also Philadelphia World Hockey
Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 499 (D. Pa. 1972) (finding
that since a contract clause had not been bargained over and its mere historical presence
caused the clause to not meet exemption requirements); Itri, supra note 151, at 336-37
(equating the bargaining that occurred in Clarett, with respect to the Rule, with "surface
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analysis implicates the irreconcilability of the early decision of
the Supreme Court in Jewel Tea with its later decision in Brown.
In essence, the Jewel Tea balancing of competing antitrust and
labor policies, while necessitating subjective determinations by
the examining court, explicitly declined to establish a
complicated and narrow set of factors to apply to a particular set
of circumstances, preferring instead a "forest for the trees"
approach. 241 Brown, in contrast, stated that only a bargaining
term that "grew out of, and was directly related to, the lawful
operation of the bargaining process" 242 would implicate the
exemption. The district court paraphrased this Brown approach
in its above finding, and implied that an examining court must
find that the term in question was specifically and irrefutably
birthed during the bargaining process of an agreement. 243
Problematically, the district court began the initial stages of its
overall analysis by expressly adopting the Jewel Tea approach
used by the Second Circuit.244 Yet, in this circumstance, the court
made the switch to a Brown hair-splitting scrutiny to justify the
distinction it found.245
In summary, the convoluted standards promulgated by the
Supreme Court throughout the history of the non-statutory labor
exemption have led to the distortion of the very purpose of the
bargaining" under NLRB decisions and concluding that the issue was divided by a "thin
line").
241 See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 700 (balancing competing interests of organized labor
negotiations against antitrust policies of the Sherman Act); see also Brown, 518 U.S. at
234 (citing Jewel Tea for the proposition that the exemption "substitutes legislative and
administrative labor-related determinations for judicial antitrust-related determinations
as to the appropriate legal limits of industrial conflict"); 3-54 ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION, SECOND EDITION § 54.03 (2004) (stating that Jewel Tea's analytical
approach was a broad balancing of competing interests).
242 Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
243 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 391 (stating that "[tihe Supreme Court has
'implied this ... exemption from federal labor statutes, which set forth a national labor
policy favoring free and private collective bargaining, which require good-faith bargaining
over wages, hours, and working conditions... "') (quoting Brown, 518 U.S. at 236)
(emphasis in original)).
244 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (citing Jewel Tea as the decision which defined
the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption).
245 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (citing Brown for the proposition that the
exemption only applies to subjects that arose from a collective bargaining process and
deciding on the facts of Clarett that this requirement was not met and so the exemption
could not apply to the Rule); see also Brown, 518 U.S. at 250 (exempting a bargaining
term only when that term "grew out of, and was directly related to, the lawful operation of
the bargaining process"). See generally In the News, 25 ENT. LAW REPORTER 9 (2004)
(summarizing the Clarett opinion and making clear that the case was decided on narrow
factors unlike the broad balancing of interests exercised in Jewel Tea).
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exemption: the preservation of congressional intent when
confronted with cases implicating both antitrust and labor
policies. 246 Expansion of the scope of the exemption in particular
has been problematic, resulting in the judiciary having wide
subjective discretion to afford weight to a particular policy,
making discretion completely dependent upon the limited facts of
a particular case. 247 As illustrated by the district court in Clarett,
courts have struggled to reconcile the conflicting opinions of the
Supreme Court, resulting in splits among the circuits. This
reconciliation often fails, resulting in both a cursory and unsound
analysis. 248 A limitation on the scope of the non-statutory labor
exemption by the Supreme Court in future cases would serve to
remedy this problem. 249 A strong curtailing of the exemption
would prevent employers like the NFL in Clarett from even
claiming immunity in many instances, thereby avoiding the
situation where lower courts apply the very "un-expert" antitrust
246 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 131 (holding that the "Supreme Court has never
delineated the precise boundaries of the exemption..."); Heyl, supra note 180, at 1054
(stating that "[flollowing Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Connell, the interplay between labor
law and antitrust law was at best uncertain. There is some merit in the argument that
the philosophy behind those three decisions conflicts with congressional intent to keep
antitrust law out of labor issues"); Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 327, 328 (1996)
(noting the Court has struggled to reconcile anti-trust laws with federal labor laws and
that its doctrine remains unsettled).
247 See Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989
DuKE L.J. 339, 415 (1989) [hereinafter Lock II] (suggesting that a new policy must be set
forth by the Court to reduce the degree of unpredictability caused by the current broad
scope of the labor exemtion leading to uncertainty in industry decision making); Michael
Pepper Nachman, Antitrust Law - The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption from Antitrust
Liability Continues to Afford Protection to a Multiemployer Bargaining Unit Even After a
Past Agreement Ends, and the Entity Retains the Duty to Bargain Once a Good Faith
Impasse is Reached in Contract Negotiations, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1094, 1120 (1997)
(discussing Supreme Court case law, and Brown in particular, and concluding that the
exemption's scope has grown too wide so that, even by the Court's own acknowledgement,
it now undermines Congressional intent); see also Covelli, supra note 25, at 257
(discussing the widening scope of the exemption and its potential impact).
248 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 390-93 (attempting to reconcile the various
interpretations of the Court's opinions); Sheet Metal Div. v. Local Union 38 of the Sheet
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 195 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (reconciling Supreme Court
cases and Circuit court cases with respect to the non-statutory exemption); see also
Pamela Clark, supra note 20, at 571 (criticizing the Court's inconsistency with respect to
the non-statutory exemption).
249 See generally Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 511 F.
Supp. 509, 517 (E.D. La. 1981) (noting the lack of direction provided for by the Supreme
Court for lower court application of the non-statutory labor exemption), rev'd on other
grounds, 690 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. La. 1982); Carson, supra note 172, at 1179-80 (observing
the fact Supreme Court case law provides unclear direction for lower court application of
the non-statutory labor exemption); Wood, supra note 41, at 346-47 (explaining how the
non-statutory labor exemption analysis is unpredictable and relies on subjective weighing
by lower court judges of arbitrarily picked factors).
618 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:3
discretion that the Supreme Court feared would subvert
congressional labor policy.250
E. Off-sides - The Evolution of the "Reasonableness" Defense in
Antitrust Suits
The NFL claimed a second defense in Clarett, arguing that the
three-year draft eligibility rule was a reasonable restraint of
trade.251 Clarett, in contrast, claimed that the rule is harmful to
competition as it provides for a complete bar from market entry
by a specified class of players, notwithstanding their ability to
compete in the market. 252 The district court said that under § 1
of the Sherman Act, Clarett would prevail if he could "first
establish a combination or some form of concerted action between
at least two legally distinct economic entities... [The complaint]
must then proceed to demonstrate that the agreement
constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade... ."253 As the
concerted action by the NFL teams was undisputed, the court
was left to determine whether the three-year rule is an
unreasonable restraint of trade.254
To determine whether the rule was an unreasonable restraint
of trade, the district court employed what is called the "quick
250 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 407 (describing plaintiffs claim of exemption);
Consolidated Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n., 602 F.2d 494, 512 (3rd Cir. 1979)
(providing an example of litigation to determine exemption availability that might be
prevented if a clear set of standards for exemption application were present), vacated, 448
U.S. 902 (1980); U.S. Info. Sys. v. IBEW Local Union No. 3, No. 00 Civ. 4763, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1038, *8-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (giving an example of present confusion
regarding what to allege for successful pleading of non-statutory labor exemption).
251 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 389 (noting the NFL's demand for a trial to
determine if the league's contested rule is a reasonable restraint of trade).
252 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (stating Clarett's argument that the NFL's
rule is void as in contrast with antitrust law).
253 See Capital Imaging v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 542 (2d Cir.
1993) (summarizing pleading requirements for a Sherman Act § 1 claim); see also Larry V.
Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern PA Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 670 F.2d 421, 428-32
(3rd Cir. 1982) (analyzing group boycotts as an element of unreasonable restraint on
trade); cf. De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313, 1320 (3rd Cir. 1975) (holding
concerted action did not create an unreasonable restraint on trade).
254 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 404-10 (analyzing whether the NFL's rule is an
unreasonable restraint on trade). See generally Muko 670 F.2d at 428-32 (discussing
elements of unreasonable restraints on trade); Darren Rovell, Legal Eagles Explain
What's Next, ESPN, Sept. 23, 2003, at http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=
1622080 (discussing the NFL rule, the court's holding and unreasonable restraints of
trade).
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look" approach for analyzing the claim. 255 This approach,
however, is one of five doctrines applied by the Supreme Court to
antitrust claims over the years. 256 Due to the numerous options,
lower courts have had the unfortunate discretion to determine
which approach they will utilize in their analysis, or worse,
amalgamate one or more of the approaches, thereby losing the
benefits of each.257 This range of standards has lead to
widespread confusion and misapplication, resulting in lengthy
litigation and judicial inefficiency. 258 The quandaries these
multiple doctrines present necessitate the promulgation of a
simpler approach to determining the reasonableness of a
restraint of trade. 259
F. The Playbook - Five Standards
To determine whether a practice is an unreasonable restraint
of trade, the Supreme Court has applied five doctrines: (1) the
ancillary restraints doctrine; (2) the per se rule; (3) the rule of
255 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 407-08 (applying the "quick look" approach to the
NFL's rule).
256 See Grewe, supra note 6, at 231-32 (describing the Less Restrictive Alternatives
doctrine and its varied application); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Price Fixing, The Professions,
and Ancillary Restraints: Coping with Maricopa County, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 925, 932
(1982) (discussing in detail the Ancillary Restraints doctrine and briefly noting other
approaches applied by the Supreme Court); Thomas Piraino, A Proposed Antitrust
Approach to Collaborations Among Competitors, 86 IOwA L. REV. 1137, 1144-45 (2001)
(explaining thoroughly the Per Se approach to applying the non-statutory labor
exemption).
257 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 346 (defining the Ancillary Restraints doctrine).
Compare Int'l Logistics Group, Ltd. v. Chrysler Corp., 884 F.2d 904, 907 (6th Cir. 1989)
(applying the Rule of Reason doctrine as requiring a five factor analysis) with Polk Bros.,
Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying the Rule of
Reason doctrine such that analysis of market power is the first step to application of the
non-statutory labor exemption).
258 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999) (finding the lower court
applied the wrong approach and consequently came to the wrong conclusion when
applying the non-statutory labor exemption); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac.
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985) (deciding the Per Se rule was
misapplied by the lower court); Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661-62 (1982)
(holding the lower court misapplied the Per Se rule).
259 See Donald L. Beschle, "What, Never? Well, Hardly Ever": Strict Antitrust Scrutiny
as an Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 514-15 (1987)
(arguing the Per Se rule is problematic and outlining a replacement for the Per Se rule);
Sergio Baches Opi, The Approaches of the European Commission and the U.S. Antitrust
Agencies Towards Agencies Towards Exclusivity Clauses in Licensing Agreements, 24 B.C.
INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 85, 92-93 (2000) (providing an example where confusion
surrounding the non-statutory labor exemption has prompted changes in its application
culminating in the Rule of Reason doctrine); Thomas R. Webb, Fixing the Price Fixing
Confusion: A Rule of Reason Approach, 92 YALE L.J. 706, 730 (1983) (describing the
inconsistent, arbitrary application of the Per Se rule).
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reason; (4) the "quick look"; and (5) the less restrictive
alternatives doctrine. 260 At common law, the ancillary restraints
doctrine stated that particular ancillary restraints on commerce
deemed lawful at common law were not restraints of trade
subject to the Sherman Act.261 In United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co.,262 the Sixth Circuit articulated the doctrine in terms
of its benefits to commerce, stating "it became apparent to. . . the
courts that it was in the best interest of trade that certain
covenants in restraint of trade should be enforced." 263 The Court
believed that certain anticompetitive practices were necessary
and beneficial to business.264 Examples of these acceptable
practices included joint decisions between tradesmen in regard to
the location of their business, the scope of production and the
product price. 265 The doctrine acknowledges that businesses
would operate more efficiently without the continual threat of
antitrust restrictions impeding such internal decisions. 266
The per se approach determines whether a restraint on trade
can be conclusively presumed unreasonable given its necessary
effect. 267 In Northern Pacific Railroad Company vs. United
260 See Choslovsky, supra note 16, at 304 (discussing in detail application of the Rule
of reason doctrine); see also Harrison, supra note 256, at 932 (discussing in detail the
Ancillary Restraints doctrine and briefly noting other approaches applied by the Supreme
Court); Krauze & Mulcahy, supra note 53, at 247-48 (describing the Quick Look approach
and its applications).
261 See U.S. v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) (noting that the Act does
not cover agreements entered into to promote legitimate business and which do not
directly restrain commerce); Roberts, supra note 5, at 346 (explaining the origin of
ancillary restraints doctrine); see also Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 179 F. 115,
117 (8th Cir. 1910) (finding that giving the exclusive right to sell a product which
incidentally or indirectly restrains competition does not violate antitrust laws).
262 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
263 Id. at 280.
264 See id. (noting anticompetitive covenants were important as incentive to industry
and honest dealing in trade).
265 See id. (stating "when two men became partners in a business, although their
union might reduce competition, this effect was only an incident to the main purpose of a
union of their capital, enterprise, and energy to carry on a successful business, and one
useful to the community").
266 See id. (noting that it was equally for the good of the public and trade, when
partners dissolved, that each partner promise not to compete with the other); Roberts,
supra note 5, at 346-47 (providing rationale behind application of doctrine); see also
Standard Oil v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (holding that by not directly prohibiting
monopolies, the Act indicates that properly exercised freedom of contract is the most
efficient means for the prevention of monopoly).
267 See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60 (holding that the statute intended to protect
commerce from being unduly restrained); Anderson, supra note 3, at 129 (stating that
"[a]pplication of the per se rule circumvents the need for the in-depth inquiry into facts
and circumstances required under the rule of reason"); Jay P. Yancey, Comment, Is the
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States, 268 the Supreme Court stated that a restriction is
considered a violation per se when it is lacking in redeeming
virtue or can be "conclusively presumed to be unreasonable"
caused by a "pernicious effect on competition."269 Under this
standard, justifications for the challenged conduct are not
entertained.270 Examples of conduct deemed unreasonable per se
include horizontal price fixing271 and "group boycotts." 272 In
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 27 3 the Court noted
that:
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with
other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden
category. They have not been saved by allegations that they
were reasonable in the specific circumstances, nor by a
failure to show that they fixed or regulated prices, parceled
out or limited production, or brought about a deterioration in
quality. Even when they operated to lower prices or
temporarily to stimulate competition they were banned. [We
have] said that such agreements, no less than those to fix
minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby
restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own
judgment. 274
In addition, under this approach the Court must first
determine if the conduct falls within a category of activity
Quick Look Too Quick?: Potential Problems with the Quick Look Analysis of Antitrust
Litigation, 44 KAN. L. REV. 671, 677 (1996) (noting that no proof of market power, effect,
or purpose is necessary to condemn a restraint as unreasonable).
268 356 U.S. 1 (1958)
269 See id. at 4-5 (noting that the principle of per se unreasonableness makes the
restraints proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to benefit everyone).
270 See id. at 5 (noting that certain agreements or practices are unreasonable without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their
use); see also U.S. v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972) (holding that certain
business relationships are per se violations of the Act without regard to their
reasonableness); Yancey, supra note 267, at 677 (stating that "the per se rule does not
consider justifications or reasonableness of challenged conduct").
271 See U. S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (asserting that those
who control the prices can control or dominate the market); Yancey, supra note 267, at
677 (noting that price-fixing among competitors is a classic example of per se illegal
restraint); see also Anderson, supra note 3, at 129 (explaining that it is generally accepted
that restraints such as price are presumptively unreasonable).
272 See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959)
(explaining that group boycotts have not been saved by allegations that they were
reasonable in the specific circumstances); Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir.
1999) (stating that "generally, group boycotts are illegal per se"); see also Anderson, supra
note 3, at 129 (noting that group boycotts are presumptively unreasonable).
273 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
274 Id. at 212.
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previously labeled per se barred. 275 Should it fall within a
category of deeds traditionally believed anticompetitive, there is
little need for detailed analysis. 276
Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States277
outlined the "rule of reason" approach. 278 In essence, the Court
held that some restraints on commerce may promote competition,
and are therefore reasonable. 279  Restraints that suppress
competition are unreasonable. 280 A list of factors to be considered
when determining whether a restraint is reasonable under this
standard include: (1) the type of business in question; (2) the
effect of the restraint on the business; (3) the type of restraint; (4)
the reason for adopting the restriction; (5) the end desired by
imposition of the restriction; and (6) whether the restraint is
actual or probable. 281 Unlike the per se analysis, the rule of
reason examines the justifications for a particular restraint and
its pro-competitive effects. 282 Pro-competitiveness is proven by a
showing that the activity: (1) has redeeming features; (2) has
275 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984) (stating that per se
rules are employed to determine the significance of the restraint based on the nature or
character of the contract); see also Klor's, 359 U.S. at 211 (noting that § 1 of the Sherman
Act prohibits acts which under common law were deemed, by their "character," to be
unduly restrictive); Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60 (discussing that the standard to be used
in determining whether prohibitions had been violated was the "standard of reason"
applied at common law that dealt with subjects of character).
276 See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 (noting that per se rules are invoked when the
probability of anticompetitive conduct is such that further examination by the court is
unwarranted); see also Klor's, 359 U.S. at 211 (stating that it is not for the courts to
decide whether injury has occurred when the action falls into a class of restraint that is
traditionally restrictive); Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 65 (discussing that once the effect and
character of the conduct was considered a restraint of trade, the court could not substitute
its own reasoning to take it out of the statute).
277 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
278 See id. at 238 (discussing the test to determine if the conduct in question is a
reasonable regulation of business consistent with Anti-Trust law).
279 See id. at 238-41 (describing how the restraint in question actually shortened the
working day and promoted competition within the industry).
280 See id. at 238 (noting that if the restraint imposed suppresses or destroys
competition, it does not pass the test of "legality").
281 See id. (listing relevant factors in determining if the restraint suppresses
competition); see also Choslovsky, supra note 16, at 304 (listing the factors used in the
rule of reason analysis); Yancey, supra note 267, at 675 (enumerating the factors
necessary to determine the legality of a particular restraint).
282 See Nat'l Soc. of Profl Eng's v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (differentiating the
per se from the rule of reason analysis); see also Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 240-41
(discussing the pro-competitive effects as justification for upholding the restraint); Lance
McMillian & James Ponsoldt, The Judicial Legitimization of Horizontal Price-Fixing
Among Partially Integrated Health Care Providers: An Antitrust/Health Care Case Study,
50 Ala. L. Rev. 465, 474 (1999) (stating that the rule of reason analysis should be
employed over the per se analysis to give consideration to the competitive effects).
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benefits that outweigh the negatives involved in the restraint of
trade; and (3) is the least restrictive alternative to achieve the
redeeming benefits. 283 The rule of reason approach involves the
most lengthy fact finding inquiry by the court, and the extensive
balancing of the numerous factors articulated above. 284 However,
the rule of reason is the standard applied by the greatest number
of courts when determining the reasonableness of a restriction. 285
Succinctly articulating the standard, Justice Brandeis stated
that "the true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition."286
The two "quick look" approaches 287 recognize that some
restraints that would traditionally be held per se illegal may have
pro-competitive benefits. 288 In NCAA v. Board of Regents,289 the
Court applied the quick look approach to an allegation of price
283 See Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 240-41 (discussing how the effects of the
restraint promoted business and competition in the industry more than before it was
implemented); see also Choslovsky, supra note 16, at 304 (noting that parties must prove
that efficiencies outweigh the threats to competition); Yancey, supra note 267, at 676
(discussing the factors defendant must prove in justification of the restraint).
284 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 763 (1999) (discussing the quick look
analysis versus a "full blown" rule of reason inquiry; see also Michael E. Comerford, B2B
Web Sites, Antitrust Concerns, and the Rule of Reason, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 649, 667-69
(2001) (noting the exhaustive analysis under the rule of reason approach); Yancey, supra
note 267, at 676 (stating that the elaborate fact-finding process burdens the courts).
285 See Cont. T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (holding the rule
of reason was the preferred standard since the early 1900's); see also Comerford, supra
note 284, at 657-58 (discussing the historical judicial preference for the rule of reason
analysis); Yancey, supra note 267, at 674 (noting that most cases utilize the rule of reason
analysis). But see McMillian & Ponsoldt, supra note 282, at 477 (stating that the per se
rule is the primary rule governing horizontal price-fixing cases).
286 Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
287 The second "quick look" approach enunciated in United States v. Brown
University, 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3rd Cir. 1993), is outside the scope of this analysis, but may
be of interest to those looking for a deeper understanding of the topic. See also Yancey,
supra note 267. at 671-706, discussing the two "quick look" approaches, and Alan J.
Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule of
Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 461 (2001), arguing against conventional wisdom and positing
the "quick look" approach hinders free trade.
288 See U.S. v. Topoco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (holding that per se illegal
restriction of competition in one area may promote healthy competition in another area).
See generally, Meese, supra note 287, at 461 (discussing the similarities of reasoning in
Topoco and NCAA); Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 78-79 (2003) (discussing cooperation and competition and how
both forms of interaction can enhance competition).
289 See NCAA v. Board-of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 85 (1984) (holding the Sherman Act
was violated by a televised collegiate football plan).
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fixing by the NCAA.290 The Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma brought an antitrust suit against the NCAA for fixing
the price networks paid to schools for television rights to sporting
events. 291 The networks agreed to pay a "minimum aggregate
compensation" to schools and generally all teams received the
same fee for television rights without regard for the ratings. 292
The Supreme Court examined both the findings and holding of
the district court and the Tenth Circuit in making its
determination. 293 The district court had made a full fact-finding
inquiry, and applying many of the "rule of reason" factors,
determined the practice was anticompetitive. 294 In contrast, the
Tenth Circuit decreed the price-fixing practice illegal per se.295
The Supreme Court relied on the findings of the district court,
and not the Tenth Circuit, to come to its conclusion. 296 While the
Court did not hold that the district court's findings -were
presumptive of anticompetitive activity, it affirmed the district
court's holding.297 Following this determination, the Court took a
"quick look" at the commercial objectives sought by the
anticompetitive activity, and determined that they were
legitimate. 298 However, upon examining the justifications offered
by the NCAA for the conduct, the Court resolved that price-fixing
did not achieve the NCAA's goals, and that less restrictive
alternatives existed to reach the same ends. 299 In essence, the
"quick look" approach consisted of two steps. First, the Supreme
Court took a quick look at the NCAA's justifications to determine
290 See id. at 88 (noting the respondents had alleged that the NCAA had
unreasonably restrained trade in the area of televising football games).
291 See id. at 88-96 (summarizing the background controversy of the televised plan at
issue and the prior plans).
292 See id. at 92-93 (explaining the particulars of the NCAA plan).
293 See id. at 95-99 (summarizing the lower court's findings and rationales).
294 See id. at 114 (noting that the District Court found that the television plan did not
create any "procompetitive efficiencies," rather televised football could be marketed just
as efficiently without the plan).
295 See id. at 97-98 (addressing the holding and rationale of the Court of Appeals
decision).
296 See id. at 98-120 (discussing the district court's findings throughout the opinion).
297 See id. at 120 (holding "only that the record supports the District Court's
conclusion that by curtailing output and blunting the ability of member institutions to
respond to consumer preference, the NCAA has restricted rather than enhanced the place
of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation's life").
298 See id. at 118-22 (declaring that "maintaining a competitive balance among
amateur athletic teams" is a legitimate commercial purpose).
299 See id. at 119 (noting that other sports have found ways to maintain competitive
balances "without resort to a restrictive television plan").
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whether further inquiry was necessary. 300 When answered in the
affirmative, the Court then reviewed the facts of the case and
made a determination whether the activity was
anticompetitive. 301 The "quick look" approach has been
characterized as an intermediate standard between the per se
and rule of reason approaches. 302
The less restrictive alternatives doctrine has never been
"formally" recognized by the Supreme Court, but has been
applied by many lower courts in determining the reasonableness
of a restraint of trade.3 03 The circuits have each developed their
own formulation of the doctrine, frequently as the third prong of
the three-tiered rule of reason analysis. 304 The Second Circuit
articulated the doctrine in Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop,
Inc:30 5
[E]stablishing a violation of the rule of reason involves three
steps. First, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing
that the challenged action has had an actual adverse effect
on the competition as a whole of the relevant market. Then,
if the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to
establish the pro-competitive redeeming virtues of the
action. Should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff
must then show that the pro-competitive effect could be
300 See id. at 96 (stating District Court rejected NCAA's gate attendance
justification).
301 See id. at 99 (determining that these facts are similar to those where
anticompetitive practices were found).
302 See Yancey, supra note 267, at 679 (noting that "quick look" approach is used
when per se approach is inappropriate and where entire industry analyses are not
required); see also United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3rd Cir. 1993)
(stating that courts sometimes apply the "quick look" standard rather than the rule of
reason and per se rule); James Murphy Dowd, Oligopsony Power: Antitrust Injury and
Collusive Buyer Practices in Input Markets, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1075, 1108 (1996) (explaining
that judicial resources are saved when using "quick look" analysis).
303 See Grewe, supra note 6, at 227 (stating that courts differ on how many restrictive
alternatives must be present for the doctrine to apply); Jeffrey Gordon, Baseball's
Antitrust Exemption and Franchise Relocation: Can a Team Move?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1201, 1241 (1999) (positing courts could rule in favor of less restrictive alternatives when
deciding whether relocation rules are restraints of trade); Konsky, supra note 6, at 1588
(noting that most courts have considered less restrictive alternatives in rule of reason
analyses).
304 See Grewe, supra note 6, at 231 (noting that circuit courts have four opinions on
how to apply less restrictive alternatives doctrine); see also U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that less restrictive
alternatives are only one consideration in weighing whether restraint of trade has
occurred); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding
that there is no restraint of trade just because less restrictive alternatives exist).
305 Clorox v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F,3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997).
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achieved through an alternative means that is less
restrictive of competition. 306
Under this doctrine, the burden is on the plaintiff to
demonstrate that activities less restrictive of trade would
accomplish the pro-competitive justifications offered by the
defense. 307
G. Interception - Applications of Different Doctrines to Draft
Restrictions
In the context of professional sports, and draft eligibility
particularly, courts have used a number of the approaches
discussed above to determine whether certain employment
practices used by professional sports leagues are unreasonable
restrictions of trade.308 In 1978, the D.C. Circuit declared that
the NFL draft - as it existed in 1968 - was an illegal restraint of
trade. 30 9 In Smith v. Pro-Football,310 the court applied the rule of
reason to make its determination. 311 In so doing, the court found
that the purpose of the draft was to restrict competition among
teams for the market of college players, and forced players to
negotiate with only a single team.312 The effect was the
suppression of competition. 313 The court declared that the college
draft would only survive the rule of reason examination upon a
306 Id. at 56.
307 See id. at 56 (declaring that determining harm to consumers is paramount); see
also Capital Imaging v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993)
(deciding that individual injuries to competitors "will not suffice"); Bhan v. NME Hosp.,
Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that restraint must be of "significant
magnitude").
308 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138 (holding that the NFL's actions were not per se
violations); Smith, 593 F.2d at 1188 (noting the league had adopted less restrictive terms
for player negotiations); Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850, 858 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (stating
the rule of reason must be applied in this draft eligibility case).
309 See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1184-85 (noting that, even though NFL's purpose was not
unreasonable, restraint of trade existed in 1968).
310 Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (1976).
311 See id. (holding that because less restrictive alternatives existed, the rule of
reason was inapplicable to the NFL draft).
312 See id. at 745 (stating that "restrictions comprising the draft 'are naked restraints
of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition"') (quoting White Motor Co. v. U.S.,
372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)).
313 See id. (describing how the draft is "inconsistent with the free-market principles
embodied in the Sherman Act') (quoting U. S. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146
(1966)); see also Piraino, supra note 256, at 934 (noting the draft's limits on competition);
cf. Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect. 1999 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1265, 1335 (1999) (explaining that the Smith court "ignored a fundamental goal to
which the draft contributed - competitive balance").
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showing of economically pro-competitive benefits that
outweighed its anticompetitive effects. 314
In contrast, other courts have employed the per se approach. In
Denver Rockets v. All Pro Management, Inc.,3 15 an
underclassman successfully challenged the NBA draft eligibility
rule.316 The rule banned any player from the college draft who
was not four years removed from high school.317 The court
determined that the NBA's justification for the rule, namely, that
it was a less expensive alternative to a farm system to train
younger players, was without merit.318 In particular, the court
noted that the rule was "absolute" and made no accommodation
to evaluate players seeking to enter the draft but for the
existence of the ban. 319 Similarly, a World Hockey Association
("WHA") rule prohibiting any player under the age of twenty
from playing with any league team was struck down in Linseman
v. World Hockey Association.320 The court again struck down the
rule by applying the per se standard, rejecting the WHA's
contention that the maintenance of this free farm system was
essential to the economic viability of the league. 321 The court
responded succinctly that there is no antitrust exception for
economic necessity. 322 In addition, the court noted that should
314 See Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 738 (stating that the court would have to declare the
draft a "reasonable way of pursuing legitimate business interests" or that it strikes what
the defendants call a "competitive balance" for it to be lawful).
315 325 F. Supp. 1049 (1971).
316 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1049.
317 See id. at 1059 (quoting section 2.05 of the NBA bylaws which describe the
ineligibility of high school players).
318 See id. at 1066 (rejecting the NBA's argument claiming collegiate athletics as "a
more efficient and less expensive way of training young professional basketball players").
319 See id. at 1066 (noting the impropriety of the overly broad and absolute rule).
320 439 F. Supp. 1315 (1977) (holding that the NHL rule was an "unreasonable
restraint on trade," which violated the Sherman Act).
321 See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1322 (applying the per se standard, which holds
restraints of trade illegal regardless of any justification, despite the argument that the
NHL did not have a farm system of its own to develop hockey players); Robert D. Koch, 41h
and Goal: Maurice Clarett Tackles the NFL Eligibility Rule, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 291
(2004) (commenting on the court's refusal to adopt WHA's economic necessity argument);
Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C. McKinnon, Professional Football's Draft Eligibility
Rule: The Labor Exception and the Antitrust Laws, 33 EMORY L.J. 375, 431 (1984)
(describing the court's rationale in rejecting the WHA's economic necessity argument).
322 See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1322 (noting the fact that it was not economically
feasible for the NHL to create its own farm system was not a valid excuse to restraining
trade).
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the WHA desire a training ground for its players, it would need
to fund a farm system for that purpose. 323
H. Overtime - Clarett v. NFL Illustrates the Need for a
Simplified Approach
When Maurice Clarett challenged the three-year draft
eligibility rule, even legal analysts found it difficult to predict the
particular approach that the district court would employ to
evaluate the reasonableness of the rule's restraint on trade.324
Whereas Smith's draft challenge was evaluated under the rule of
reason, the almost identical NBA draft eligibility provision was
struck down per se in Denver Rockets.325 In addition, Clarett
alleged that the rule constituted a group boycott by the league
teams, a category traditionally found per se illegal. 326 However,
the court in NCAA v. Board of Regents327 categorized horizontal
restraints on competition (i.e., group boycotts) in professional
sports leagues as essential to the existence of the industry. 328
This placed professional sports in a special category of business
entities.329 The district court eventually applied a combination of
the rule of reason, quick look and less restrictive alternatives
323 See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1322 (pointing to the free market system, which
determines that if the World Hockey Association wants its own farm system, it should
incur the cost of creating it).
324 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 337-38 (citing various sports league cases using
different tests and rules leaving no guidance for court to rule on similar cases); see also
Grewe, supra note 6, at 246 (noting that district courts apply two rules in various ways);
McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 321, at 418-19 (highlighting court's use and
application of both Rule of Reason and per se unreasonableness).
325 See Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 745 (evaluating draft under Rule of Reason); Denver
Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066 (concluding that NBA rules subject to per se rule applicable
to group boycotts); see also Roberts, supra note 5, at 358 (discussing six similar lower
court decisions, two upheld under rule of reason while other four held as per se
violations).
326 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 390 (analyzing Clarett's claim that the NFL's rule
constitutes illegal "group boycott"); see also Grewe, supra note 6, at 240-41 (mentioning
that group boycotts are normally analyzed under per se rules); McCormick & McKinnon,
supra note 321, at 419 (stating that principle of per se is applied to boycotts).
327 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
328 See id. at 104 (determining whether challenged restraint enhanced competition).
329 See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 321, at 421 (applying general anti-trust
and boycott rules to professional football); see also Bryant, supra note 15, at 98
(commenting that professional sports create a challenge to antitrust law); Mirabito, supra
note 18, at 858 (arguing that current statutory scheme is inadequate due to unique nature
of professional sports).
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approaches to determine whether the three-year draft rule was
an unreasonable restraint of trade. 330
The district court first acknowledged that NCAA v. Board of
Regents took "into account the realities of the [football] industry's
regulatory landscape," and thereby found that "group boycotts" in
the context of professional football are unique circumstances not
subject to immediate dismissal per se.331 Ironically, the district
court's recognition that professional football should not be
treated as equivalent to any other industry is directly
contradictory to the Supreme Court's express holding in Brown
that professional football should not be afforded any special
treatment.332 Recall that the Court expressed it could not "find a
satisfactory basis for distinguishing football players from other
organized workers."333 While the Supreme Court's holding in this
instance was in reference to the collective bargaining process, the
district court in Clarett relied on that reasoning.334 This
demonstrates an internal inconsistency in the treatment of
professional football as a business entity in the context of the
court's overall analysis. 335
Second, the district court cited the rule of reason three-step
burden shifting test as articulated above in Clorox v. Sterling
Winthrop Inc. 336 The court first reasoned that a group boycott
denying market entry in this instance is:
330 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 405-06 (applying three step burden-shifting test);
see also Capital Imaging v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 542-43 (2d Cir.
1993) (discussing the doctrines used to shift the burden. See generally Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (articulating how the rule of reason
analysis should be undertaken).
331 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 405 (discussing Supreme Court's Rule of Reason
and application).
332 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 265 (1996) (refusing to shield NFL
from antitrust liability imposed on every other union); Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 411
(holding antitrust laws as inapplicable and Clarett was therefore not precluded from NFL
draft); Bryant, supra note 15, at 110 (stating court's holding that professional sports is not
unique to labor law and should not be treated differently).
333 Brown, 518 U.S. at 249-50.
334 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (utilizing Brown's reasoning when analyzing
scope of non-statutory labor exemption); see also Bryant, supra note 15, at 107-08
(discussing Brown's reasoning regarding collective bargaining); Covelli, supra note 25, at
285 (analyzing Brown's effect on collective bargaining).
335 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 390 (applying case to antitrust, business and labor
laws); see also Bryant, supra note 15, at 114 (criticizing Brown for failing to recognize
purpose of non-statutory labor exemption); Covelli, supra note 25, at 284-85 (critiquing
Brown as bringing labor law and antitrust law into conflict).
336 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 405 (clarifying that under the three-step burden
shifting test the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the challenged action
2004]
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Precisely the sort of conduct that the antitrust laws were
designed to prevent: 'whatever other conduct the Acts may
forbid, they certainly forbid all restrains of trade which were
unlawful at common-law, and one of the oldest and best
established of these is a contract which unreasonably forbids
any one to practice his calling.'337
The court then examined the Denver Rockets case, and
although rejecting the per se approach, determined that its
eligibility rule analysis was sound.338 However, when the NFL
argued that Clarett did not make out his prima facie case by
failing to sufficiently define the relevant "market," the district
court switched to a quick look approach.339 The court held that
the draft eligibility rule "is the perfect example" of a restriction
appropriately analyzed under the quick look method due to its
"blatantly anticompetitive" policy.340 Following this articulation,
however, the court moved back to examine the remaining two
prongs of the rule of reason approach, holding that the rule had
no legitimate pro-competitive justification. 341 Finally, the court
held that "even if pro-competitive justification for the Rule
existed [thereby satisfying that prong of the rule of reason
approach], summary judgment for Clarett would be appropriate
because an alternative to the Rule exists that is less prejudicial
to competition."3 42
has had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market, then
after the plaintiff satisfies its threshold burden of proof under the rule of reason, the
burden shifts to the defendant to offer evidence of the pro-competitive redeeming virtues
of their combination, if the defendant comes forward with such proof, the burden then
shifts back to plaintiff for it to demonstrate that any legitimate collaborative objectives
proffered by defendant could have been achieved by less restrictive alternatives); see also
Clorox v, Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that under the
rule of reason analysis the court must determine whether the restraints in the agreement
are reasonable in light of their actual effects on the market and their pro-competitive
justifications); Capital Imaging v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir.
1993) (explaining that in most cases plaintiff must prove an antitrust injury under the
rule of reason).
337 Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (citing Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408 (2d
Cir. 1948)).
338 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (concluding that age-based eligibility
restrictions in professional sports are anticompetitive because they limit competition in
the player personnel market by excluding sellers).
339 See id. at 407 (stating that Clarett had sufficiently defined the relevant market
and discussing the quick look approach as an alternative when the conduct does not
clearly fit into the per se category).
340 See id. at 408.
341 See id. at 409 (holding that Clarett must prevail because there is no legitimate
pro-competitive justification for the rule).
342 See id. at 410.
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While the district court's analysis of the reasonableness of the
draft rule's restraint on trade seems logically cogent, the case
highlights the uncertainty inherent in determining the
controlling approach to this issue. The court in Clarett created an
analysis that included elements of three particular approaches:
the rule of reason, the quick look, and the less restrictive
alternatives doctrine. 343 It also cited decisions as support for its
analysis that employed completely different approaches to a
factually similar issue.344
Each approach has its drawbacks. For example, the rule of
reason approach consists of lengthy fact finding exercises that
may protract litigation and waste judicial resources. 345 The per se
approach may dismiss a facially restrictive practice as illegal,
whereas a more than cursory analysis would show the activity to
be pro-competitive. 346 The "quick look" approach, particularly at
the trial court level, may result in little more than a per se
analysis with a passing recognition that some justifications are
offered, depending on the court's diligence. 347 Finally, the least
343 See id. at 405-10 (discussing and applying the three approaches); Clarett,
369.F.3d at 129 (addressing the lower court's approach). See generally Nell I. Brown &
James R. Burns, Antitrust Violations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 163, 167-71, & n.37 (2000)
(explaining three approaches).
344 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408 n.179 (citing Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526
U.S. 756, 780 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); Clarett, 306
F. Supp. 2d at 408 n.176 (citing Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509, 514 n.6 (2d Cir. 1999));
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 405 n.165 (citing Capital Imaging v. Mohawk Valley Med.
Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993)).
345 See Cont. T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (stating that fact-
finding weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint of trade); Va. Vermiculite,
Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 549, 570-71 (W.D. Va. 2000), aff'd 307 F.3d 277
(4th Cir. 2002) (deciding that rule of reason requires elaborate inquiry into the actual
conditions of the market); Dowd, supra note 302, at 1108 n.158 (positing that rule of
reason potentially generates tremendous waste of judicial resources by forcing the
plaintiff to conduct extensive market analysis and present resultant evidence to the
court).
346 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (noting
previous court decisions that held certain agreements as so plainly anticompetitive that
they presume illegal without further examination under the rule of reason generally
applied in Sherman Act cases); see also Brown & Burns, supra note 343, at 167-68 & n.21
(discussing per se rule as a rule that looks to whether the business practice facially
appears to be one that tends to restrict competition thus resulting in presumption of
illegality); Shlomi Feiner, Regulation of Playing Equipment by Sports Associations. The
Antitrust Implications, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 585, 602 n.86 (2002) (stating that courts
prefer the rule of reason approach over the per se approach because the league may
employ facially restrictive practices that have redeeming qualities for competition).
347 See In re Northwest Airlines Corp. Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 174, 206 (E.D.
Mich. S. Div. 2002) (stating that in a quick look approach the focus is on defendant's
proffered pro-competitive justifications); Meredith E. B. Bell & Elena Laskin, Antitrust
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restrictive alternatives doctrine's fatal flaw is both a lack of
formal recognition from the Supreme Court, and the subjective
determination courts must employ to determine whether an
alternative is truly less restrictive. 348 When courts hear factually
similar cases yet employ markedly different approaches, this
practice nullifies the stare decisis value of any of the analyses. 349
Predictability is the foundation of the American judicial system
and a necessary element to a body of law with such a far-
reaching impact.350
V. QUARTERBACK SNEAK - A PROPOSAL TO ALLOCATE
REASONABLE RESTRAINT APPROACHES
The "quick look" approach applied by the Supreme Court in
NCAA v. Board of Regents was hailed as an attractive alternative
Violations, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 357, 363 (1999) (discussing the quick look approach as
combining the efficiency of the per se rule with the more in depth informational inquiry of
the rule of reason as the court can consider the pro-competitive justifications submitted by
the defendant); Yancey, supra note 267,'at 706 (concluding that quick look approach is
often reduced to a veiled per se ruling).
348 See American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc. 521 F.2d 1230, 1249 (1975)
(noting that the Supreme Court has never indicated that the presence of a less restrictive
alternative to further a legitimate purpose was a decisive factor in its rule of reason
analysis); see also Alan J. Meese, Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), 9 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 761, 788 n.132 (2001) (arguing that the application of the least restrictive alternative
test can have the "counter intuitive result" of "penaliz[ing] restraints not for reducing
competition, but for failing to increase it enough"). See generally Grewe, supra note 6, at
235-36 (noting that the Ninth Circuit has changed its standard of review, and the relative
weight of the factors in the balancing test based on differing fact situations, and that the
Supreme Court has never formally recognized the least restrictive alternatives test).
349 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?: The Supreme Court, Federal Courts,
and the Nature of the "Judicial Power" 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 975-76 (2000) (noting the
difficulty that federal courts have in following the recent Supreme Court antitrust
decisions while being bound by stare decisis to follow the "undermined - but - not-
expressly-overruled antitrust decisions issued by the Warren Court" ); see also James C.
Rehnquist, The Power that Shall be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, The Constitution
and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 347 (1986) (discussing the importance of
stare decisis in ensuring that "like cases will be treated alike"); Roberts, supra note 5, at
337 (arguing for the necessity of stare decisis doctrine to apply in antitrust cases
involving professional sports leagues).
350 See Margaret .N. Kniffen, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory
Action by United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 82-83 (1982) (noting
that a goal of stare decisis is the "predictability of judicial decisions", which allows
individuals to behave in accordance with a legal standard, especially when it concerns
commercial transactions); Roberts, supra note 5, at 404 (positing that results from cases
based on unpredictable standards may reach correct conclusions, but more likely will
interfere or conflict with antitrust and labor policy). But see Marc J. Yoskowitz, A
Confluence of Labor and Antitrust Law: The Possibility of Union Decertification in the
National Basketball Association to Avoid the Bounds of Labor Law and Move into the
Realm of Antitrust, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 579, 585-86 (1988) (noting the criticism
that has arisen among scholars concerning Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption,
which has been upheld solely because of stare decisis).
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to both the complicated rule of reason analysis and rigid per se
approach. 351 However, this was not due to the ingenuity of its
method or apparent ease of application. The effectiveness of the
quick look technique is due, in part, to the inherent nature of an
appellate body and reviewing court. 352 The necessity of a lengthy
analysis was significantly lessened by the availability of a fully
fleshed out evidentiary record to examine. 353 Application of this
approach on the trial level, however, may lead to the problematic
disguised per se analysis discussed earlier. In an effort to err on
the side of caution, the use of the rule of reason approach by
trial-level courts allows for the development of a complete factual
record. 354 A full record invariably serves justice by ascertaining
relevant information before making hasty or misinformed
351 See Peter W. Bellas, NCAA v. Board of Regents: Supreme Court Intercepts Per Se
Rule and Rule of Reason, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 529, 531-32 (1985) (describing the "quick
look" method as the most functional way of analyzing competitive impacts in antitrust
cases); Daniel E. Lazaroff, The Influence of Sports Law on American Jurisprudence, 1 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 15 (2001) (noting the Supreme Court's decision in NCAA has had a
powerful impact on antitrust jurisprudence that extended past sports). But see Wood,
supra note 41, at 339 (criticizing the "quick look" approach as a superficial analysis that
revealed the inherent weakness of the non-statutory exemption).
352 See Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. 277 F.3d 499, 511 (2002) (noting
that the Supreme Court has not approved of a "quick look" analysis based upon anything
"less than a full evidentiary hearing, either before an administrative agency or in court");
Thomas C. Arthur, Symposium: The Future Course of the Rule of Reason a Workable Rule
of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337
(2000) (arguing that restraints that have not already been categorized by the Supreme
Court under the per se or quick look analysis require a full rule of reason analysis); see
also Yancey, supra note 267, at 694 (discussing the potential mistakes that a district court
can make in identifying market power or relevant market without the benefit of a full
finding at its disposal).
353 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999) (stating that the nature of
antitrust law increases the necessity of lower courts to explain the logic and the support
of their reasoning, rather than use a "quick look" analysis based upon assumptions that
are not "obvious"); see also Chul Pak & Willard K. Tom, Symposium: The Future Course of
the Rule of Reason: Toward a Flexible Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 391 (2000)
(discussing the relationship between the various modes of analysis and the risks that the
plaintiff and defendant face as a result). See generally NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468
U.S. 85, 105-07 (1984) (engaging in "quick look" analysis based upon the extensive
findings of the District Court).
354 See Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their
Application, ANTITRUST LAW PARA. 1507 (2002) (advocating the evaluation of the evidence
under a rule of reason standard by a judge rather than a jury because the court has the
obligation to expose the assumptions that underlie its interpretation of the evidence);
Yancey, supra note 267, at 706 (noting that under the rule of reason standard, courts
acquire the evidence that is necessary to make its' evaluation). But see Anderson, supra
note 3, at 150 (arguing that the rule of reason is not necessary in sports antitrust cases
because of the amount of judicial experience that has been accumulated about this issue,
reducing the chance of a misinformed decision).
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decisions.355 A finding of an antitrust violation carries swift and
heavy penalties to be levied upon the transgressor. 356 The public
is better served by protecting parties from the serious
punishments associated with antitrust violations through a
comprehensive analysis, rather than a cursory approach in the
name of judicial efficiency. 357 As such, it is proposed that trial
level courts limit their analysis -to the combined rule-of-reason
and least restrictive alternatives approach, reserving the quick
look approach for use only by appellate courts. 358
355 See Sam Stanton, Burden Shifting and Presumptions Under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act after California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 247, 251 (2000)
(noting that one of the benefits of the rule of reason analysis over the per se analysis is
that the restraint at issue could appear to fit into a per se category, but may not be
unreasonable without further inquiry); see also Joseph P. Bauer, Multiple Enforcers and
Multiple Remedies: Reflections on the Manifold Means of Enforcing the Antitrust Laws:
Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 303, 304-15 (2004)
(describing the extent of antitrust enforcement by the government and by private
citizens). But see Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745, 783-85 (2004)
(describing the administrative costs and confusion that are associated with the rule of
reason test).
356 See Charles N. Charnas, Segregation of Antitrust Damages: An Excessive Burden
on Private Plaintiffs 72 CAL. L. REV. 403, 404-06 (1984) (explaining the purposes of the
treble damages remedy for antitrust violations); see also Kimberly Pace, The Tax
Deductibility of Punitive Damage Payments: Who Should Ultimately Bear the Burden for
Corporate Misconduct?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 825, 833-34 (1996) (noting that Congress
prevented corporations from deducting treble damages paid for antitrust violation
because allowing deductions would contradict public policy). See generally Krauze &
Mulcahy, supra note 53, at 279-82 (describing the penalties sought and imposed for
antitrust violations).
357 See Clark Havighurst & Nancy King, Private Credentialing of Health Care
Personnel: An Antitrust Perspective, 9 AM. J. L. AND MED. 131, 179 (1983) (positing that
"although the antitrust laws do not directly require procedural fairness, procedures are
certainly relevant in a total evaluation of a competitor-sponsored credentialing or similar
program under the rule of reason to determine whether it affects competition adversely");
James Langenfeld & Louis Silvia, Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Restraint Cases:
An Economic Perspective, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 653, 685 (1993) (suggesting that between the
two extremes of the per se and rule of reason approach there "exists a gray area," where
judicial efficiency suggests the need for a systematic approach to reviewing agreements
among competitors"). But see Mary J. Davis, Section II. Summary Adjudication Methods
in United States Civil Procedure, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 253-54 (1998) (arguing that
complex litigation such as antitrust suits "are well suited to motions for summary
judgment in spite of their complexity").
358 See Daryl A. Libow, The Laker Antitrust Litigation: The Jurisdictional "Rule of
Reason" Applied to Transnational Injunctive Relief, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 645, 666 (1986)
(arguing that "rule of reason analysis would compel trial courts to employ a specific set of
factors in their determinations and provide appellate courts with specific standards
against which to review the propriety of lower court decisions"); Manisha M. Sheth,
Formulating Antitrust Policy in Emerging Economies, 86 GEO. L.J. 451, 459 (1997) (noting
that "appellate courts have begun to employ a "quick look" rule of reason approach to
practices that resemble the per se offenses but which have some efficiency justifications
due to special extenuating circumstances"); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Anticipating Antitrust's
Centennial: The Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV.
835, 843 (1987) (discussing the majority opinion in Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 26,
which "defined a more narrow range of situations in which appellate courts would make
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VI. END ZONE - CONCLUSION
Clarett v. National Football League highlighted two major
categories of antitrust jurisprudence whose constituent case law
is inconsistent, obscure, and highly subjective. 359 While the
Clarett result was correct, the district court's analysis reflected
the fact-dependant subjective approach to the non-statutory labor
exemption explicitly scorned by the Supreme Court.360 Also, the
district court's approach to determining whether the NFL three-
year draft rule was a reasonable restraint of trade illustrated the
existence of five applicable doctrines. 361 The potential
manipulation of these approaches by the lower courts is
essentially unpredictable. I propose that trial-level courts apply
the rule of reason approach, and reserve the quick look approach
to appellate courts. This would streamline five standards into
two. First, it allows for the development of a full record,
including any defenses or justifications offered by a defendant,
thereby solving the difficulties encountered using the per se
approach. Second, it promotes judicial efficiency by limiting
appellate discretion when making determinations of
"reasonableness." Currently, these determinations require what
is essentially fact-finding by the reviewing court, 362 which are
the ultimate decision, requiring full inquiry by the trial court whenever both injury to
competition and increased efficiency are possible effects of defendant's conduct").
359 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 130 (noting that courts "have carved out two categories of
labor exemptions to the antitrust laws: the so-called statutory and non-statutory
exemptions"); see also Itri, supra note 151, at 315 (acknowledging that it is uncertain how
a court would approach the issue presented Clarett); McCormick & McKinnon, supra note
321, at 386 (arguing that while "specific contours of the labor exemption remain
uncertain" precedent and court application of the labor exemption doctrine "clearly show
that the interests protected by the draft eligibility rule are far removed from those which
national labor policy clothes with immunity").
360 See Jean Wegman Burns, The New Role of Coercion in Antitrust, 60 FORDHAM L.
REV. 379, 405 (1991) (positing that "the Supreme Court's apparent elimination of coercion
from the rationale, agreement, and standing elements of vertical restraints is consistent
with another, often implicit, aspect of the economic efficiency approach - the avoidance of
subjective facts in determining the legality of a restraint"); Itri, supra note 151, at 308
(noting that the rule of reason approach "should be limited to an agreement's effect on
economic competition only"); McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 321, at 391-92 (arguing
that the vagueness of the Court's approach towards these types of cases "makes a
mechanical application of the ... test improper").
361 See generally Clarett, 369 F.3d at 408 (citing Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S.
756, 779 (1999), for the proposition that the "categories of analysis of anticompetitive
effect are less fixed than terms like 'per se,' 'quick look,' and 'rule of reason' tend to make
them appear").
362 See Anthony J. Dennis, Most Favored Nation Contract Clauses Under the
Antitrust Laws, 20 DAYTON L. REV. 821, 848 (1995) (stating that "the rule of reason, the
standard of judicial review mandated for non-per se offenses, dictates a facts and
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better made at the trial level.363 Finally, reducing the number of
potential standards from five to two would increase predictability
in antitrust suits. 364 This would benefit practitioners in the field
as well as promote the doctrine of stare decisis. 365
circumstances-type of analysis which considers numerous factors"); see also Dibadj, supra
note 355, at 785 (arguing that creating and enforcing competition law is not the job for the
judiciary because it "further burdens an already heavy caseload and stretches the fact-
finding capacities of juries"); Handler, supra note 12, at 1324 (positing that antitrust
disputes "could be more expeditiously handled administratively rather than judicially at
the fact-finding stage").
363 See Jerome Shuman, The Application of the Antitrust Laws to Regulated
Industries, 44 TENN. L. REV. 1, 66-67 (1976) (advancing the theory that in agency
reasonableness determinations "Appellate courts would have no way to measure
independently the severity of the anticompetitive effects or the magnitude of other public
interest benefits"); Andrew Stuart, "I tell ya I don't get no respect!" The Policies
Underlying Standards of Review in U.S. Courts as a Basis for Deference to Municipal
Determinations in GATT Panel Appeals; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 23 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 749 (1992) (noting that "federal courts of appeals review the fact
finding of trial judges under the 'clearly erroneous' standard, while for constitutional,
historical, and political reasons, they review jury "fact finding" (which in reality can
involve a fair amount of law application) under the more deferential 'substantial evidence'
standard"). But see Herbert Hovenkamp, Fact, Value and Theory in Antitrust
Adjudication, 1987 DUKE L.J. 897, 905 (1987) (posting that "proponents of the argument
for treating all theoretical issues as questions of law argue that trial judges should not be
able to make economic or antitrust policy and insulate that policy from review by
disguising it as merely 'factual"').
364 See Philip C. Kissam, Antitrust Boycott Doctrine, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1165, 1176-77
(1984) (arguing a problem with the rule of reason is it invites courts to engage in ad hoc
balancing which may result in incoherent analysis, a lack of predictability, and
inconsistency in results); James McNeill, Comment, Extraterritorial Antitrust
Jurisdiction: Continuing the Confusion in Policy, Law, and Jurisdiction, 28 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 425, 454 (1998) (noting that "the history of Sherman Act enforcement via the federal
courts has proven to be a mixed bag. Predictability of result depends greatly on which
circuit hears the case"); see also Donald Turner, Anticipating Antitrust's Centennial: The
Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 797, 798-
99 (1987) (finding that "the function of courts is to formulate antitrust rules that promote
the economic goals of competition. Ideal rules are clearly predictable in their application
and economically rational in that they outlaw anticompetitive conduct but not conduct
that is economically beneficial").
365 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (finding that "stare decisis is the
preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to
the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process"); Lisa M. Constance, Antitrust
Law - Exercising the Rule of Reason: Supreme Court Revises Analysis of Vertical
Maximum Price-Fixing, Bringing it Closer to Achieving the Goals of the Sherman Act, 75
CAL. L. REV. 797 (1999) (arguing that "the doctrine of stare decisis promotes the
predictable development of the law, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes
to the integrity of the judicial process"); Piraino, supra note 256, at 786 (stating that the
"lack of clear guidance from the courts and agencies has left both practitioners and
business executives confused as to the legality of particular mergers").
